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The	global	economy	remained	highly	buoyant	over	the	summer,	although the 
advanced economies generally recorded stronger activity than the emerging market 
economies. The main reason for this is the greater progress made by the advanced 
economies in the vaccination process, which has meant that the course of the 
pandemic has been relatively more favourable in these countries and, therefore, that 
their containment measures have been less stringent.
More	 recently,	 some	 tentative	 signs	 of	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	 slowdown	 have	
begun	to	appear.	From the high levels reached previously, the latest data from the 
economic sentiment indicators show some decline. This may possibly be linked to 
the apparently growing difficulties observed worldwide to ensure that the supply of 
certain intermediate goods is sufficient to meet the demand. This factor could also 
partly explain the small loss of momentum observed in world trade. Both the United 
States and China, the two largest economies, are among the countries showing 
more visible signs of growth moderation.
The	 inflationary	pressures	observed	worldwide	appear	 to	be	predominantly	
transitory.	Supply bottlenecks have contributed to the increase in production costs, 
although in recent months oil price rises have levelled off and the prices of some 
metals have even fallen back a little. On past evidence, these inflationary pressures 
should be transitory. Yet they could become more persistent, depending on the 
extent to which firms pass these higher costs through to final prices, and workers 
pass the higher prices through to their wage demands. Regarding this latter channel, 
the degree to which higher inflation will affect private sector wages will possibly 
depend, inter alia, on the signalling effect that the increases agreed for public sector 
wages and pensions may have on them. These considerations mean that global 
inflation is shrouded by unusually high uncertainty. 
In	the	euro	area,	growth	in	activity	continued	over	the	summer. The increase in 
the proportion of the population that is vaccinated has meant that, although the rate 
of growth of infection has been relatively high, the consequences in terms of 
hospitalisation and mortality rates have been lower than in the past. In the light of 
these developments, the authorities have mostly opted to avoid reintroducing further 
restrictions, which has encouraged the recovery of activity in the services sectors. 
In addition, financing conditions for private and public agents alike have remained 
favourable, which has contributed to continued economic dynamism. By contrast, 
the scarcity of certain inputs has limited growth in the manufacturing sector.1
1 See	Box 3,	“Euro area manufacturing bottlenecks”.
1 OVERVIEW
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 8 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 3/2021  QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
The	latest	ECB	staff	macroeconomic	projections	point	to	a	continuation	of	the	
recovery	 in	 the	medium	 term.2 Specifically, after rising by 5% in 2021, GDP is 
expected to grow by 4.6% in 2022 and by 2.1% in 2023. Under this scenario, euro 
area GDP could return to its pre-crisis level by the end of this year and could be 
slightly more than five percentage points (5 pp) over that level at the end of 2023. 
As	at	the	global	level,	the	significant	increase	in	inflation	in	the	euro	area	to	
August	 should,	 in	 principle,	 be	 essentially	 transitory. The factors that have 
temporarily driven up inflation should weaken over the course of 2022. For this 
reason, although the average inflation rate estimated in the latest ECB staff 
projections for 2023 is slightly higher than that envisaged three months ago, the size 
of the revision is rather modest, 0.1 pp to 1.5%, a figure which is below the new 2% 
target over the medium term established following the Governing Council’s 
announcement on 8 July.3 However, as in other geographical areas, the possibility 
that the present growth in inflation may be more persistent cannot be completely 
ruled out.4 
The	 inflation	 outlook	 under	 the	 baseline	 scenario	 of	 the	 ECB	 staff	
macroeconomic	projections	led	the	ECB’s	Governing	Council,	at	its	meeting	
2 See ECB	staff	macroeconomic	projections	for	the	euro	area,	September	2021.
3 See	Box 4,	“Review of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy strategy”.
4 Box  7,	 “The factors underlying the recent increase in inflation in Spain”,	 presents	 a	 qualitative	 discussion,	
specifically	for	Spain,	of	the	various	factors	that	have	recently	determined	consumer	price	patterns.
MAIN SPANISH MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES (a)
Table 1
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Information available to 14 September 2021. The shaded figures are Banco de España projections.
b Contribution to the quarter-on-quarter rate of change of GDP, in percentage points.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
2020 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
National Accounts
Quarter-on-quarter rate of change, unless otherwise indicated
7.28.24.0-0.01.718.71-4.5-8.01-tcudorp citsemod ssorG    
2.25.33.0-3.07.518.51-2.4-8.8-domestic demand (b) fo noitubirtnoC    
5.07.0-1.0-3.0-3.10.2-2.1-0.2-)b( dnamed lanretxe ten fo noitubirtnoC    
Year-on-year rate of change
5.58.826.3-1.6-4.6-0.52-3.4-4.01-dekrow sruoh :tnemyolpmE    
    Harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) -0.3 0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.8 0.5 2.3 3.1
    Harmonised index of consumer prices excluding energy 
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of	9	September,	to	maintain	its	highly	expansionary	monetary	policy	stance. 
The activity and inflation projections described above depend on the maintenance 
of favourable financing conditions for public and private agents in the euro area. 
Against this background, the Governing Council confirmed that the set of measures 
deployed will remain in place, with a slight downward adjustment to the volume of 
purchases under the pandemic emergency purchases programme (PEPP), in keeping 
with the aim of maintaining favourable financing conditions.
In	Q3,	 the	Spanish	economy	appears	 to	be	growing	at	a	similar	 rate	 to	 the	
previous	quarter.	This assessment is based on the available conjunctural data and, 
in particular, the analysis of effective social security registrations (i.e. registrations 
excluding furloughed workers) and the results of the latest edition of the Banco de 
España’s Business Activity Survey (EBAE, by its Spanish initials).5 Specifically, the 
quarter-on-quarter growth rate of GDP is estimated to have been 2.7%. The 
calculations involved are subject to the considerable uncertainty that has existed 
since the start of the pandemic on account of the weakening of the historical 
relationship between the conjunctural indicators and the economy’s output. And this 
5 See “Encuesta a las empresas españolas sobre la evolución de su actividad: septiembre de 2021”,	 Notas	
Económicas,	Boletín Económico,	3/2021,	Banco	de	España.
The reduced probability of infection and serious illness in COVID-19 cases among the vaccinated population has led to a further easing 
of the containment measures, fostering continuation of the highly buoyant phase observed in spring, especially in the services sectors 
hardest hit by the restrictions. The HICP has continued to rebound, although the rise in inflation is, in principle, predominantly temporary.
IN Q3 ECONOMIC ACTIVITY APPEARS TO HAVE REMAINED AS BUOYANT AS IN Q2 (a)
Chart 1
SOURCES: Eurostat, INE and Banco de España.
a Quarter-on-quarter rates of change based on the seasonally adjusted series in the case of GDP, and year-on-year rates of change in the case of the 
consumer price indices.
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in a setting marked by the gradual adaptation of economic agents’ behaviour to the 
measures to contain the health crisis, so that such measures have become 
progressively less of a hindrance to activity. An important additional source of 
uncertainty, in the particular case of this summer, is the limited information available 
to date on tourist flows beyond the month of July.6
The	current	circumstances	are	conducive	to	the	favourable	trend	in	activity	
continuing	in	the	short	term. The labour market has continued to improve notably, 
particularly in those industries hardest hit by the pandemic. The resulting 
strengthening of income, along with the decline in the uncertainty surrounding the 
course of the disease, is underpinning buoyant household spending, especially on 
services. In future, this demand component could remain highly dynamic, although 
this will depend on the use consumers decide to make of the stock of savings 
accumulated since the start of the pandemic. In contrast, the recent rise in the price 
of the consumer goods and services basket will tend to depress the purchasing 
power of household income. Moreover, growth may be hindered in the coming 
quarters if the supply constraints that are particularly severe in certain production 
processes persist.
The	latest	macroeconomic	projections	for	the	Spanish	economy	envisage	a	
continuation	of	the	current	upswing	in	activity.7 The average rate of GDP growth 
is projected to stand at 6.3%, 5.9% and 2% in 2021, 2022 and 2023, respectively. 
Notable among the factors underpinning this favourable outlook is the continued 
support of economic policy, both fiscal and monetary. The gradual firming of the 
recovery in activity can be expected to pave the way for a progressively less 
expansionary national fiscal policy stance over the projection horizon, in a setting in 
which the reversal of the sharp increase in public debt as a consequence of the 
pandemic would significantly help to reduce the macro-financial vulnerabilities of 
the Spanish economy. Assuming that appropriate projects are selected, the Next 
Generation EU (NGEU) programme will make a considerable contribution to Spanish 
GDP during the period considered and, more importantly, will contribute to the 
structural transformation of the economy and the improvement of its long-term 
growth capacity.
The	Spanish	economy	will	regain	its	pre-crisis	level	of	GDP	during	2022. The 
lag with which Spain is expected to regain its pre-crisis level of GDP compared to 
the euro area as a whole, which is estimated at somewhat less than one year, reflects 
the comparatively more severe impact of the pandemic in Spain during its initial 
stages and, above all, the greater importance of services with a high degree of social 
interaction, associated, in particular, with tourism.
6 See	Box	6,	“Recent developments in inbound tourism in Spain”.
7 See	Box	1,	“Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2021-2023)”.
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Under	the	projections	scenario,	economic	activity	in	Spain	is	subject	to	some	
uncertainty.	The hypothetical emergence of new variants of the virus may require 
the reintroduction of containment measures, with a consequent adverse impact on 
trade flows and the movement of persons. This might happen, for example, if the 
effectiveness of vaccines is reduced or the infection becomes more contagious in 
countries in which the immunisation process is less advanced. At the same time, a 
more pronounced improvement in activity cannot be ruled out, should earlier 
resolution of the health crisis lead private agents (and, in particular, consumers) to 
spend more than envisaged under the projections scenario.
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Certain bottlenecks in global 
supply chains are persisting 
and the percentage of firms 
whose production is limited by 
a lack of material and/or 
equipment is increasing
These problems are expected to 
be temporary and to gradually 
disappear as demand returns to 
normal and supply adapts
Depending on their persistence,
— Possible transmission of these frictions 
to other sectors outside manufacturing
— Additional upward pressure on prices 









Economic activity in Spain appears to have 
maintained strong momentum in Q3. 
Growth forecasts for the period 2021-2023 
have been revised up slightly
In August, the IMF completed the largest 
general allocation of special drawing rights 
(SDRs) in its history. The measure could 
provide particularly significant support for the 
most vulnerable economies
A growing percentage of manufacturing firms 
are being affected by shortages of material or 
equipment. This factor, should it persist, could 
influence the path of recovery and lead to higher 
inflation rates 
Although the current high rates of inflation in 
Spain are expected to ease over the coming 
quarters, some factors could contribute to 
prolonging the current inflationary trajectory
The most recent information available points to 
a considerable upturn in inbound tourism in 
Spain over the summer season. However, it 
remains well below pre-pandemic levels 
Since the onset of the pandemic, gender 
disparity in the Spanish labour market has 
increased in terms of the unemployment rate 
and hours worked, but decreased in terms of 
the labour force participation rate
On 8 July, the ECB announced a new 
monetary policy strategy, seeking to 
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This box describes the key features of the most recent update 
to the Banco de España’s macroeconomic projections for the 
Spanish economy. In comparison with the previous ones 
published on 14 June,1 the current projections incorporate 
the new information that has become available since then, 
including the preliminary Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) 
estimates for 2021  Q2 and the changes in the technical 
assumptions underlying the performance of the different 
variables (see  Table A.1).2
The progress made over the year in vaccinating the 
population against COVID-19 has helped check the 
spread of infection and, above all, reduce the severity of 
the disease and, therefore, hospitalisation and mortality 
rates. This has enabled a gradual easing of the pandemic 
containment measures. As a result, since early spring 
economic activity has become more dynamic.
This translated into an increase in GDP of 2.8% in quarter-
on-quarter terms in Q2, following the decline of 0.4% in 
Q1. This dynamism which, in accordance with the pattern 
observed in the euro area overall, was notably more 
marked than was anticipated in the baseline scenario of 
the June projections, led to a narrowing of the gap 
between the current and the pre-pandemic GDP levels. In 
Q2 it stood at 6.8 percentage points (pp), still exceeding 
the corresponding gap for the euro area overall (which 
stood at 2.5 pp).
GDP growth in Q2 was underpinned by the strength of 
domestic demand and, in particular, of private 
consumption, which appears to have increased very 
substantially in quarter-on-quarter terms – by 6.5% –, well 
above the 2.9% rise considered in the June projections. 
Within this latter aggregate, there was a particularly 
marked increase in spending on services which, as they 
require closer social contact, benefitted from the easing 
of the pandemic containment measures. The end of the 
state of alert in May 2021 was a milestone in this respect. 
On the indicators available, economic activity appears to 
have remained highly dynamic in Q3. This has been 
achieved in a setting in which the ongoing lifting of 
restrictions was barely affected by the increased incidence 
of the pandemic up to the end of July. This is because, as 
indicated above, the health consequences have been less 
severe than in previous waves, owing to the vaccination 
progress.
Various data inform the view that economic growth has 
been high again in Q3, notably the data on changes in 
effective social security registrations (i.e. registrations 
excluding furloughed workers). In addition, the results of 
the latest edition of the Banco de España’s Business 
Activity Survey (EBAE, by its Spanish initials) show that 
firms perceive an improvement in their turnover for Q3 
similar to that perceived three months ago for Q2.3 
As in the spring, output growth seems to have been 
comparatively more pronounced in those services 
activities that are still further from their pre-pandemic 
activity levels. The improvement in branches of activity 
linked to tourism is particularly notable, driven essentially 
by demand from residents which in July exceeded the 
2019 figures. By contrast, the present situation continues 
to be less favourable for non-resident tourism, given that 
there are still some – albeit increasingly less stringent – 
restrictions in place on international travel. Despite these 
restrictions, the gradual recovery in inbound tourism has 
continued, although it is still well below its pre-pandemic 
levels. Specifically, inbound tourism spending in July was 
less than half that recorded in July 2019.4
Compared with these developments in the services 
sector, the recent performance of some industrial sectors 
– whose activity has been affected by the shortage of 
certain goods used in the production process, such as 
semiconductors and plastics – has been somewhat less 
favourable. These supply difficulties have begun to affect 
production processes in some key branches of Spanish 
industry (in particular, the car industry).5
Analysis of all the available data suggests that GDP 
growth in Q3 could be similar to that observed in Q2. 
Box 1
MACROECONOMIC	PROJECTIONS	FOR	THE	SPANISH	ECONOMY	(2021-2023)




3	 	M.	 Izquierdo	(2021),	Encuesta a las empresas españolas sobre la evolución de su actividad: septiembre de 2021,	Notas	Económicas,	Banco	de	
España.
4	 	See	Box	6,	“Recent developments in inbound tourism in Spain”.
5	 	See	Box	3,	“Euro area manufacturing bottlenecks”.
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Box 1
MACROECONOMIC	PROJECTIONS	FOR	THE	SPANISH	ECONOMY	(2021-2023)	(cont’d)
Specifically, it is estimated that GDP may have risen by 
2.7% in quarter-on-quarter terms. However, the 
uncertainty surrounding this estimation is very high, since 
there are still relatively few quantitative data available for 
the summer months. There are also doubts regarding the 
size of the contribution to economic growth made by the 
projects linked to the Next Generation EU (NGEU) 
programme, given the limited information available in this 
respect.
Beyond the current quarter, the projections are based on 
the assumption that the epidemiological situation will 
continue to improve, in Spain and internationally. In 
particular, it is assumed that the proportion of the 
population that is vaccinated will continue to grow, with 
no significant new setbacks relating to the appearance of 
more contagious or more vaccine-resistant strains of the 
virus.
In this scenario, a further gradual normalisation of economic 
activity is expected, which will also be driven by other 
factors. These notably include the expansionary behaviour 
of imports in the developed economies, with which Spain 
has close trade relations, and the continued support for 
economic activity provided by demand policies, which will 
tend to limit the scarring the crisis may leave on the 
productive system (in terms of destruction of firms and 
higher structural unemployment). In particular, the ECB’s 
monetary policy will continue to provide important support 
for private agents’ spending through the maintenance of 
favourable financing conditions. In turn, the roll-out of the 
projects associated with the European NGEU programme 
will support the recovery in activity and will tend to boost 
the economy’s potential output.
All the above is expected to translate into continued GDP 
growth. It is estimated that the quarterly growth rates will 
be particularly pronounced in the period up to mid-2022, 
as this is when the increases in expenditure associated 
with the NGEU programme are expected to be highest.
On the demand side, GDP growth will be underpinned, 
especially in the short run, by domestic spending by 
resident agents. Private consumption is expected to 
continue to be a fundamental growth driver in the coming 
quarters, although as it gradually converges towards 
levels in accordance with its long-term determinants, its 
growth rate can be expected to moderate from the 
unexpectedly high levels recently observed. This is 
compatible with a gradual reduction in the household 
saving rate, which was very high throughout 2020 and in 
early 2021. Nevertheless, household saving is still 
expected to be somewhat above its pre-pandemic level in 
2023. Also projected is a notable increase in private 
productive investment, in a setting of recovery in demand 
and maintenance of favourable financing conditions and 
in which the projects associated with the NGEU 
programme will represent an important stimulus for this 
aggregate. Finally, net external demand is expected to 
make a positive contribution to output growth beyond the 
short term, largely associated with the gradual 
normalisation of cross-border tourism flows.
On the estimates made, GDP is expected to grow by 
6.3% in 2021 overall (see Chart 1 and Table 1). The strong 
dynamism of the economy since 2021 Q2 will give rise to 
a significant carry-over effect on the average rate of 
change of GDP in 2022.6 In consequence, GDP growth is 
also expected to be very high – 5.9% – in 2022, despite 
the significant moderation in growth rates expected 
throughout the year. Lastly, GDP is projected to grow by 
2% in 2023. As a result of all the above, it is estimated 
that GDP will recover its pre-pandemic level by mid-2022 
and that, by the end of the projection horizon, it will be 
2.5 pp above that level (see Chart 2).
These projections represent a slight upward revision of 
GDP growth of 0.1 pp in 2021 and 2022 and of 0.2 pp in 
2023. Comparing these projections with those presented 
in the baseline scenario in June, numerous factors of 
different signs converge, related to new historical data 
released, the revision of the short-term outlook and the 
changes made to the assumptions on which the 
projections are based.
The publication of the Q2 QNA data means, as compared 
with the June baseline scenario, that the starting point of 
the level of activity on which the current projections are 
based is more favourable, from the standpoint of the 
average annual growth rates in 2021 and 2022.7 By 
contrast, the short-term outlook of reduced dynamism as 
6	 	See	J.	González	Mínguez	and	C.	Martínez	Carrascal	(2019),	“The	relationship	between	average	annual	and	quarter-on-quarter	GDP	growth	rates:	
implications for projections and macroeconomic analysis”,	Analytical	Articles,	Economic Bulletin	3/2019,	Banco	de	España.	
7	 	In	accordance	with	the	INE’s	flash	estimates,	the	quarter-on-quarter	increase	in	GDP	in	Q2	was	0.6 pp	higher	than	that	projected	in	the	June	baseline	
scenario.
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compared with the June baseline scenario would lead, in 
the absence of other changes, to a downward revision of 
the projected GDP growth for this year and the next. 
Indeed, in comparison with the June projections, activity 
in H2 is, for several reasons, now expected to be 
somewhat less dynamic. First, the admittedly scant 
information available on implementation of the NGEU 
programme appears to indicate something of a delay in 
the execution of the expenditure relative to the schedule 
considered in the June projections (see Annex 1). Further, 
the sharp rise in private consumption in Q2 (significantly 
larger than projected in June) may mean this aggregate is 
converging more swiftly towards pre-pandemic levels. In 
addition, the growth outlook for consumption has also 
been adversely affected by the impact of the current 
upturn in inflation on real household income. Lastly, there 
have been signs that the recent intensification of strains 
associated with the scarcity of certain intermediate goods, 
which has been observed over the course of the year, has 
begun to adversely affect production in some key 
industrial sectors; moreover, these supply problems will 
foreseeably take months to disappear.
Regarding the changes to the external assumptions, as 
compared with those used for the baseline scenario of the 
June projections, their overall impact on GDP growth is 
Box 1
MACROECONOMIC	PROJECTIONS	FOR	THE	SPANISH	ECONOMY	(2021-2023)	(cont’d)





























REAL GDP. LEVEL (2019 Q4 = 100)
 SEPTEMBER 2021   JUNE 2021. BASELINE SCENARIO
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
NOTE: Latest QNA figure published: 2021 Q2.
a Projections cut-off date: 14 September 2021.
b Annual average.
2020 2021 2022 2023 2020 2021 2022 2023 2020 2021 2022 2023 2020 2021 2022 2023
September 2021 -10.8 6.3 5.9 2.0 -0.3 2.1 1.7 1.3 0.5 0.3 1.0 1.4 15.5 15.1 14.3 13.3









MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (a)
Annual rate of change
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Box 1
MACROECONOMIC	PROJECTIONS	FOR	THE	SPANISH	ECONOMY	(2021-2023)	(cont’d)
negative in 2021 and 2022 and positive in 2023, albeit 
relatively modest in all cases (see Annex 1).
Specifically, in the first two years of the projection horizon, 
the adverse impact on economic output stemming from 
higher prices of oil and other commodities and lower 
growth rates in export markets would more than offset the 
favourable impact of lower interest rates and the lower 
relative cost of domestic production relative to 
competitors. However, in 2023 these latter factors, 
together with the upward revision in the pace of the global 
market recovery, would drive growth higher than forecast 
three months ago. Further, the assumption that projects 
associated with the NGEU programme will be implemented 
with something of a lag vis-à-vis the June projections 
would entail a somewhat larger estimated growth impact 
in 2022 and 2023, at the expense of a lower impact in 
2021.
Developments in the main macroeconomic aggregates 
From the standpoint of the breakdown of aggregate 
demand, the projected recovery will rely mainly on the 
domestic component. However, beyond the short term 
the external sector is also expected to contribute positively 
to GDP growth.
All components of private domestic demand will rebound 
very sharply this year, following their marked declines in 
2020 (see Table  2 and Chart  3). Private consumption 
appears to have slowed significantly over the summer 
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
NOTE: Latest QNA figure published: 2021 Q2.
a Projections cut-off date: 14 September 2021.
b The rates of change for 2020 referring to the National Accounts series have been updated to include the review of Annual National Accounts for the 
years 2018-2020, published by the INE on 16 September. The new net lending/net borrowing figures for the nation and for general government will 
be published on 30 September.
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Unemployment rate (% of labour force).
Annual average 15.5 15.5 15.1 14.3 13.3 15.6 14.7 13.7
Net lending (+)/net borrowing (-) of the nation (% of GDP) — 1.1 0.1 3.1 3.4 1.5 3.1 3.1
General government net lending (+)/net borrowing (-) (% of GDP) — -11.0 -7.6 -4.3 -3.5 -8.2 -4.9 -4.3








PROJECTIONS FOR THE MAIN MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY (a)
Annual rate of change in volume terms and % of GDP
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Box 1
MACROECONOMIC	PROJECTIONS	FOR	THE	SPANISH	ECONOMY	(2021-2023)	(cont’d)
months, after the positive surprise of Q2, albeit maintaining 
notable momentum. The pace of growth in this aggregate 
is likely to diminish further in the final stretch of the year, 
as a consequence of the pressure on household income 
exerted by the current upturn in inflation. As a result, the 
recent decline in the saving rate is expected to continue in 
H2, which could see this variable drop from close to 15% 
in 2020 to around 7%, somewhat higher than the pre-
crisis level (see Chart 4).
The easing of consumption growth rates is set to extend 
into next year, owing to household spending gradually 
returning to normal levels. However, the dynamism of this 
aggregate will remain relatively high, despite the 
(foreseeably temporary) dampening effect of rising 
inflation. This against a background in which spending will 
remain underpinned by a sustained recovery in the labour 
market and, consequently, in disposable income, and 
financial conditions will continue to be favourable. In 
addition, the declining uncertainty regarding the health 
and economic situation will help reduce the precautionary 
component of saving. In any event, as discussed further 
on, there is considerable uncertainty as to the dynamism 
of this spending component, inasmuch as it is difficult to 
determine the proportion of the saving built up during the 
pandemic that households will put towards spending.
Among the components of gross capital formation, 
residential investment is expected to take on greater 
dynamism over the coming quarters. In that direction, the 
recovery in building permits reflected in the most recent 
information suggests higher growth in the execution of 
construction over the medium term. This positive outlook 
is fuelled also by declining uncertainty and favourable 
labour market developments, which have strengthened 
future household income expectations. Lastly, growth in 
this aggregate over the projection horizon will additionally 
benefit from implementation of the NGEU programme. 
Specifically, according to the Recovery, Transformation 
and Resilience Plan (RTRP), Spain will earmark a 
significant proportion of the grants it receives from the 
European Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) to 
housing renovation.
In addition, investment by non-financial corporations will 
foreseeably be particularly buoyant over the projection 
horizon, owing to a combination of various factors. These 
include a recovery in final demand (leading to increased 
plant capacity utilisation), the gradual decline in 
uncertainty and the need, heightened by the pandemic, 
for digitalisation processes.
Further, corporate financing conditions will continue to be 
favourable, against a backdrop in which the ECB’s 
monetary policy stance is expected to remain 
expansionary, following the recent strategy review and the 
latest forward guidance on the path of interest rates and 
the duration of asset purchase programmes. Lastly, one 
factor that will particularly spur this component of 
aggregate demand is the implementation of projects 
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associated with the NGEU programme, which should 
result in high rates of business investment growth in 
2022  H1. As compared with the June projections, the 
current forecasts for growth in investment in capital goods 
represent a downward revision for 2021 and upward for 
2022 and 2023. These revisions owe precisely to the delay 
(according to the information available) in implementation 
of the NGEU programme; in these projections, this has 
resulted in part of the investment flow associated with the 
European funds shifting from 2021 to 2022 and 2023.
In any event, developments in private productive 
investment will foreseeably be uneven across sectors of 
activity, depending on the particular impact of the crisis 
on each and the potentially enduring changes in demand 
for different goods and services.
As regards trade with the rest of the world, the interruption 
of the movement of goods following the outbreak of the 
pandemic was largely temporary, limited primarily to the 
spring of 2020. By contrast, the prolonged duration of 
restrictions on the international movement of people is 
having a very lasting impact on tourist flows. Over the 
projection horizon, goods exports are expected to rise, 
particularly in 2021 and 2022, in step with the strengthening 
of activity in Spain’s main trading partners, which, broadly 
speaking, belong to the group of advanced economies, 
where vaccination rates are high (comparable with that of 
Spain). Likewise, headway in the vaccination campaigns 
in Spain and the main tourism generating markets is 
helping to sustain the recovery in exports of tourist 
services. However, it will still take some time for this 
aggregate to recover pre-pandemic levels. Imports are 
also expected to grow considerably, in keeping with the 
recovery in final demand. In any event, firms in some 
industries are facing supply difficulties for certain 
intermediate goods, leading to delays in the delivery of 
import orders in certain sectors that account for a large 
proportion of sales to the rest of the world, thus stifling 
both sides of foreign trade. This is particularly true of the 
automotive industry, whose exports represented 11% of 
the total in 2019 and 2020.
The degree of labour utilisation will move on an upward 
path, in step with developments in activity. Specifically, 
hours worked are projected to grow by 8.1% in 2021, 
before moderating to 5.6% and 1.7% in 2022 and 2023, 
respectively. Despite the slight increase in the labour 
force, this employment growth will keep the 
unemployment rate on a downward path throughout the 
projection horizon, falling below pre-pandemic levels 
from mid-2022.
The general government budget balance is expected to 
improve substantially over the projection horizon, after the 
acute deterioration in 2020. This reduction in the budget 
deficit will owe to the temporary nature of some of the 
discretionary measures adopted to contend with the 
fallout from the pandemic and to the cyclical improvement. 
However, the imbalance of public finances is set to remain 
at very high levels at the end of the projection horizon. As 
a result of these projected trajectories for the general 
government budget balance and for nominal GDP, the 
government debt-to-GDP ratio, which in 2020 surged to 
120%, would barely decline by 5  pp over the horizon 
considered.
Prices and costs
Underlying inflation, as measured by the HICP excluding 
energy and food, remained at very low levels, of around 
0%, in 2021 H1, largely as a result of the negative base 
effect derived from the decline recorded less than a year 
earlier in the prices of certain services – such as tourism 
and leisure – whose consumption had been especially 
hard hit by the pandemic. The disappearance of these 
base effects, together with the gradual recovery in 
demand for consumer goods and services, primarily in 
precisely those sectors most affected by the containment 
measures, caused underlying inflation to increase in the 
summer, to 0.6% in August.
The rise in inflation is notably more marked in terms of the 
headline HICP. The upward trend in this indicator mainly 
reflects the energy component, which was strongly 
affected not only by the base effects of the slump in oil 
prices during the initial stage of the pandemic, but also by 
the subsequent increase in oil prices, and by the surge in 
electricity prices. The rising electricity prices are explained, 
above all, by the impact of the increase in the price of gas 
and, to a lesser extent, of CO2 emission allowances on 
the prices set in the wholesale market.8
8	 	See	Pacce,	Sánchez	and	Suárez-Varela	(2021),	“Recent developments in Spanish retail electricity prices: the role played by the cost of CO2 emission 
allowances and higher gas prices”,	Occasional	Paper	No	2120,	Banco	de	España.
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In principle, these energy price rises are likely explained 
by predominantly transitory factors, relating to certain 
difficulties in the supply of some raw materials, which are 
especially important in the gas market, and the sharp 
increase in global demand following the re-opening of 
economies after the most stringent pandemic containment 
measures had been lifted. In any event, these energy price 
rises not only have a direct impact on the cost of the 
household consumption basket, but also represent an 
increase in firms’ production costs, in addition to the 
increase stemming from diverse commodity price rises.9 
Historical evidence points to a limited pass-through of 
these cost increases to final product prices, but depending 
on the degree of persistence of the increases, an 
eventually greater pass-through cannot be ruled out.
For these projections it was assumed that both these 
effects and those that will arise if workers incorporate the 
recent rise in inflation into their wage demands (known in 
the literature as second-round effects) will be limited, so 
that the recent increases in the price of energy, and of 
commodities in general, will only have a temporary effect 
on consumer price inflation.
In these circumstances, the pressure exerted on headline 
HICP by the factors mentioned above will peak in 2021 
Q3, their impact on inflation progressively declining 
thereafter. In parallel, the gradual decline in the degree of 
cyclical slack will prompt a modest sustained increase in 
underlying inflation over the projection horizon. In 2022 as 
a whole, the slowdown in energy prices is expected to 
comfortably offset the increase in the prices of services 
and non-energy industrial goods, so that headline HICP 
will moderate, from 2.1% in 2021 to 1.7% in 2022 (see 
Chart 6). In 2023, it is expected to fall further (to 1.3%), 
reflecting the behaviour of non-energy components. 
Underlying inflation, despite its expected increase, is 
projected to remain at moderate levels throughout the 
projection horizon and to stand at 1.4% on average in 
2023.
The sources of uncertainty surrounding the baseline 
scenario and the risk analysis 
Since the start of the pandemic, the Banco de España has 
chosen – given the heightened uncertainty surrounding 
the epidemiological and macroeconomic outlooks – to 
publish alternative scenarios that differ in various 
dimensions, including notably the assumptions regarding 
the course of the health crisis and the measures introduced 
to fight it. The immunisation progress in Spain and the 
other European economies has allayed the uncertainties 
of a purely epidemiological nature. Although these 
uncertainties have not been fully dispelled, their significant 
reduction has prompted the decision to present a single 
scenario, which is assigned a significantly higher 
probability of materialisation than the baseline ones 
included in the sets of scenarios published by the Banco 
de España in previous quarters.
These projections are based on the assumption that the 
immunisation of the population and the continued 
effectiveness of the vaccines will ensure that the impact 
of the pandemic on economic activity will continue to 
moderate in the coming months, until it becomes 
practically unnecessary to keep containment measures in 
place. That said, more adverse epidemiological 
developments than those assumed in the current 
projections cannot be entirely ruled out. These would 
involve more serious bouts of infection, linked to a 
potential spread of variants of the virus that are more 
infectious and, in the worst-case scenario, vaccine-
resistant, that would require the reintroduction of 
containment measures.
Also, as in the June scenarios, there is notable uncertainty 
regarding household spending decisions, which affect 
two components of demand. First, as regards private 
consumption, households accumulated a large stock of 
savings during the pandemic, as a consequence of the 
restrictions on certain types of spending entailed by the 
containment measures and more cautious behaviour on 
the part of these agents. For these projections it is 
assumed that households will resort to only part of this 
large volume of accumulated savings to finance current 
spending.
There are various reasons for making this assumption. 
First, a significant part of the spending that has not been 
possible since the start of the pandemic owing to the 
restrictions in place is not easily postponed; it related 
mainly to services such as dining and leisure and it is 
unlikely that the amount not spent during the health crisis 
9	 	See	Box	7,	“The factors underlying the recent increase in inflation in Spain”.
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can be fully added on to the regular spending on these 
items. Second, the households that have most reduced 
their consumption (or most increased their saving) with 
respect to the pre-pandemic period have been those with 
the highest incomes, whose propensity to consume is 
normally lower (see Chart 5). Lastly, although the evidence 
available on the existence of this channel is not conclusive, 
it is often argued that households, anticipating that the 
high volume of government debt built up during the crisis 
will lead to future tax increases, may decide to limit their 
spending.
Taking these arguments into account, it is assumed that 
households will not use more than part of the resources 
accumulated during the pandemic to finance consumption; 
thus, although the saving rate will decline over the 
projection horizon, it will still stand, on average, at 
somewhat above its pre-crisis level in 2023. However, the 
possible transfer of a larger proportion of these savings to 
consumption is an upside risk for the growth projections.
The second demand component which continues to be 
subject to a high degree of uncertainty as a result of the 
behaviour of households (in this case, non-resident ones) 
is tourism exports. Under the current projections, although 
inbound tourism flows will follow a recovery path over the 
projection horizon, they will not come close to their normal 
levels until 2022, and will not regain their pre-crisis levels 
until the end of 2023. Since the projections incorporate 
the assumption that restrictions on activity will have 
become unnecessary by around the beginning of 2022, it 
is possible that the consequent reduction in uncertainty 
may lead to a more rapid recovery in holiday travel.10
There is also considerable uncertainty about the scarring 
of the economy caused by the health crisis that will remain 
once it has been resolved. The projections presented 
assume that the policies deployed since the start of the 
crisis will, on aggregate, ensure that the damage it has 
caused to the productive system and employment, 
through the destruction of firms and the increase in long-
term unemployment, will have a relatively limited effect on 
the economy. These expectations are in line with the 
gradual correction expected over the projection horizon in 
the proportion of vulnerable companies,11 which has risen 
as a result of the pandemic.
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10	 	In	the	case	of	business	travel,	however,	it	is	likely	that	the	pandemic	will	cause	more	persistent	changes	of	habit.
11	 	See	the	results	of	the	simulations	presented	in	R.	Blanco,	S.	Mayordomo,	A.	Menéndez	and	M.	Mulino	(2021),	Impact of the COVID-19 crisis on 
Spanish firms’ financial vulnerability,	Occasional	Paper	No	2119,	Banco	de	España.
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In fact, the dynamism with which the economy is reacting to 
the lifting of restrictions seems to confirm that the magnitude 
of the persistent damage to the productive system caused 
by the crisis is relatively modest. That said, it is still early to 
assess the likelihood of more lasting scarring.
Moreover, various aspects of the NGEU programme 
implementation are sources of uncertainty for economic 
activity. On one hand, the current projections incorporate, 
as already mentioned, on the basis of the information 
available, a somewhat longer delay in the implementation 
of these projects than was anticipated three months ago. 
However, the timing of the spending is still very uncertain. 
On the other hand, the size of the multiplier effect on 
activity is, in practice, specific to each individual project, 
so that the aggregate elasticities used for the projections 
only give an imperfect approximation of the actual effect.
Also, in the preparation of the projections, the impact on 
aggregate activity of the disruption to global supply chains 
for some materials was considered to be temporary and 
relatively limited. However, should these supply problems 
prove to be more persistent, the possibility that more 
severe production limitations in the hardest-hit sectors 
(and, thus, lower domestic sales and exports) weigh on 
the recovery cannot be ruled out.
Lastly, in the emerging market economies, where there 
has been comparatively less vaccination progress than in 
the advanced countries, a possible intensification of the 
recent outbreaks of the disease and of the restrictions 
imposed to contain them would hit activity in these 
economies, with consequent negative effects on Spanish 
exports.
The net result of this multiplicity of risks of both signs is 
considered balanced for the projections of the economy’s 
output growth.
Consumer prices are currently subject to a much higher 
degree of uncertainty than they have been in recent years, 
since the present rise in inflationary pressures could be 
more persistent than has been assumed in these 
projections. Whether this eventually happens will depend, 
first, on whether commodity prices show greater upward 
inertia than is reflected in the assumptions incorporated in 
the projection exercise and, second, on whether the pass-
through to final prices and wages of the increases already 
observed in these prices is greater than that considered in 
these projections, which, as already mentioned, is based 
on historically observed empirical regularities.
The transmission of the increases in the prices of some 
inputs to final prices could be greater than in the past if 
the recent supply problems in certain industries persist. 
The assumption that the transmission of the pick-up in 
inflation to wage growth will be limited is based on the 
multi-year nature of collective bargaining (which means 
that inflation developments in a particular period can only 
influence wage settlements in approximately one third of 
agreements) and the limited presence of indexation 
clauses. In contrast, the more or less formal indexation 
mechanisms that exist for public sector pensions and 




The construction of projections is conditional upon the 
hypothetical fulfilment of certain assumptions about the 
trajectory of a set of variables relating to the Spanish 
economy’s external markets for goods and services, 
prices in the financial and commodities markets, and 
fiscal policy. The assumptions regarding Spain’s export 
markets and competitors’ prices in domestic currencies 
were taken from the “ECB staff macroeconomic 
projections for the euro area, September 2021”, which 
use information up to 16 August. For 2021, current 
projected growth for Spain’s export markets is now 
slightly higher than in June. However, this revision in terms 
of annual average reflects a more positive performance in 
the most recent period than what was projected three 
months ago. Conversely, prospects for the second half of 
the year have now become slightly less favourable. For 
2022-2023 there are few changes in the external demand 
outlook for goods and services produced in Spain.
The assumptions regarding the paths of interest rates, 
exchange rates, and oil and other commodity prices are 
based on the average prices observed in the respective 
markets in the ten working days prior to the cut-off date 
for each projection year (in this case, 14 September). In 
the specific case of exchange rates, the assumption used 
for the entire 2021-2023 period is the spot market rate. 
For the other variables, the values observed in the futures 
markets at any time over the projection horizon are 
considered.
Broadly speaking, compared with the June projections, 
the changes in these assumptions are relatively slight. Oil 
prices on spot markets have risen in recent months. 
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Based on futures market prices for the rest of the year, the 
average of this variable in 2021 would now be $68.7 per 
barrel, an upward revision to the June assumption of 
2.9%. Futures markets also indicate that oil prices will 
decline moderately to $65.3 in 2023 (a level 3.4% higher 
than in the June projections exercise). 
Yields on securities traded on 10-year sovereign bond 
markets prior to the cut-off date for these projections are 
now lower than in June for the three-year projection 
horizon. Specifically, this variable would stand, on 
average, at 0.3%, 0.5% and 0.7% in 2021, 2022 and 
2023, respectively. The slightly upward path projected by 
the financial markets for short-term interest rates has also 
been revised, although less markedly. Specifically, the 
3-month Euribor would increase from -0.5% in 2021 to 
-0.4% in 2023. The euro exchange rate has depreciated 
slightly in the last three months on the spot markets, 
somewhat more markedly against the dollar than in 
nominal effective terms. 
These changes in the external assumptions, compared 
with those used in June, are relatively small, and the signs 
of their effects on activity and prices do not always go in 
the same direction; accordingly, their impact on the 
projections is, overall, limited. Also, explicit assumptions 
on electricity prices have been used in these projections, 
since the scale of their recent increase has implications of 
some significance for the macroeconomic outlook. 
Specifically, the assumptions prepared have taken into 
consideration prices on the futures wholesale markets 
until end-2022. Since there is less information on market 
prices at different points in time for 2023, a relatively 
neutral assumption, based on month-on-month price 
increases equal to the average observed in recent years, 
has been used. 
SOURCES: Banco de España and ECB.
a Cut-off date for assumptions: 14 September 2021. Figures expressed as levels are annual averages; the figures expressed as rates are calculated 
on the basis of the related annual averages.
b The differences are in rates for export markets, in levels for oil prices and the dollar/euro exchange rate, in percentages for the nominal effective 
exchange rate and in percentage points for interest rates.
c The assumptions regarding the behaviour of Spain's export markets presented in the table are obtained from the September 2021 ECB staff 
macroeconomic projections for the euro area.
d A positive percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate denotes an appreciation of the euro.
e For the projection period, the figures in the table are technical assumptions, prepared following the Eurosystem’s methodology. These assumptions 
are based on futures market prices or on proxies thereof and should not be interpreted as a Eurosystem prediction as to the course of these 
variables.
2020 2021 2022 2023 2021 2022 2023
International environment
3.00.07.07.34.63.99.01-)c( stekram stropxe s'niapS     
4.36.49.23.561.967.863.24 )level( lerrab/srallod ni ecirp liO     
Monetary and financial conditions
30.0-30.0-10.0-81.181.191.141.1 )level( etar egnahcxe orue/ralloD    
117.8 121.5 120.8 120.8 -1.2 -2.2 -2.2
    Short-term interest rates 
    (3-month Euribor) (e) -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.1
0.4 0.3 0.5 0.7 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4
    Long-term interest rates
    (10-year Spanish government bond yield) (e)
Difference between the current
projections and those under 
the June 2021 baseline 
scenario (b)
     Nominal effective exchange rate against the non-euro area (d)
    (2000 = 100)
September 2021 projections
Table A.1
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS (a)
Annual rate of change, unless otherwise indicated
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Lastly, the fiscal policy assumptions include several 
measures approved since the June projections. First, the 
different actions aiming to moderate the above-mentioned 
electricity price hike have been included. These measures 
were adopted at two different points in time.12 Second, 
the mechanism for offsetting the loss of pension 
purchasing power, reflected in the Draft Law currently 
before Parliament, has been introduced. This postpones 
to 2022 the expected budgetary impact of such offsetting 
owing to the rise in inflation observed this year.13 Lastly, 
the current projections include an additional extension of 
the furlough schemes to 31 December. This is pending 
approval, but is supported by the different social agents.14 
An additional source of changes in the fiscal outlook for 
this year relates to budget outturn which, according to the 
data published by the National Audit Office (IGAE), has 
improved relative to the June projections.
Additionally, the fiscal projections incorporate the final 
approval by Ecofin on 13 July 2021 of the Spanish 
Recovery, Transformation and Resilience Plan (RTRP). 
The detail of the Plan includes the projected payment 
amounts and dates, and the milestones and objectives 
which these disbursements are conditional upon. 
The most recent information available suggests that the 
absorption of RTRP funds appears to have been relatively 
modest to date. This, together with the common delays 
between the approval of procurement tenders and the 
actual expenditure, points to the need to revise the 
absorption schedule; accordingly, it is now assumed that 
part of the absorption takes place slightly later. Specifically, 
spending included in the projections for 2021 would have 
an expected impact on GDP this year of 0.6 pp, 0.4 pp less 
than that considered in the previous projections. The 
estimated effects on the economy’s output over the rest of 
the projection horizon would increase by the same amount. 
In addition, based on the latest information available, the 
assumption that spending funded by the REACT-EU15 
programme is deficit-neutral year to year has been dropped. 
Specifically, such spending would have a moderate 
amplifying effect on the deficit in the short term, which 
would be offset by an effect of the opposite sign from 2023.
Aside from the assumptions regarding European funds, 
the forecasts for the period 2022-2023 are based on the 
usual technical assumptions. In particular, it is assumed 
that items subject to greater discretionality – such as 
public investment and procurement, given their volume – 
will grow in line with the growth potential of the Spanish 
economy. Also, in the absence of specific measures, the 
trajectory of the remaining items of the general government 
accounts is assumed to be governed by their usual 
determinants.16 
Based on the changes in the various budgetary variables, 
which are the result of the related assumptions prepared, 
together with the output gap estimated in a manner 
consistent with the other macroeconomic projections, it is 
possible to estimate the fiscal policy stance, measured as 
the change in the primary structural balance, net of 
European funds.17 According to this procedure, the fiscal 
policy stance, as occurred in 2020, is expected to be 
notably expansionary in 2021 and 2022 (1.3 pp and 1.5 pp 
of GDP, respectively). However, it would become 
contractionary in 2023 (by 0.6  pp) as a result of the 
estimated reduction of the stimulus from the European 






13	 	Draft	Law	on	 the	guarantee	of	pension	purchasing	power	and	other	measures	 to	strengthen	 the	financial	and	social	sustainability	of	 the	public	
pension	system,	indexing	each	year’s	pension	rises	to	the	inflation	recorded	during	the	12	months	prior	to	December	of	the	previous	year.
14  The information available points to the possibility of a further extension to 31 January 2022.
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
Figure 1 
SYNTHESIS OF THE MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY, 2021-2023
MAIN REASONS FOR THE REVISION 
(compared with the June baseline scenario)
— Strong growth in activity in Q2 (+2.8 % q-o-q), especially in 
private consumption
— The latest information available also points to a high level of 
dynamism in Q3 (+2.7 % q-o-q)
— The use of part of the NGEU funds has been shifted from 2021 
to 2022-2023
— Recent significant rises in energy prices and the prices of 
some services












MAIN SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY
 
— The global environment and the course of the pandemic
— Private consumption dynamism going forward (rate of use of 
stock of savings accumulated and possible adverse effects 
of uptick in inflation on real household income)
— Persistence and/or intensification of bottlenecks
— Indirect and second-round effects that could mean the 
current inflationary path may last longer
6.3% 5.9% 2%
0.1 pp 0.1 pp 0.2 pp
2.1% 1.7% 1.3%
0.2 pp 0.1 pp0.5 pp
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The largest general allocation of special drawing rights 
(SDRs)1 in the history of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) was completed on 23 August 2021, for a total 
equivalent to some $650  billion (SDR  456  billion) (see 
Chart 1). This allocation is one of the most far-reaching 
multilateral economic policy responses to the crisis 
induced by the COVID-19 pandemic and could provide 
particularly significant support for low-income economies 
and the most vulnerable countries, whose over-
indebtedness has worsened with the outbreak of the 
crisis. The amount of this general allocation exceeds the 
total emergency funding granted by the IMF to low-
income countries during this crisis and is also larger than 
the debt relief agreed in the G20-led Debt Service 
Suspension Initiative (DSSI).
This box first describes the most salient operational 
aspects of general SDR allocations. It then discusses 
different options for maximising the capacity of the 
recently approved allocation to support the most 
vulnerable economies in the current circumstances. 
Generally speaking, these options would involve 
establishing some sort of mechanism providing for SDRs 
to be channelled from the countries that need them the 
least (the advanced economies and some emerging 
economies) to the most vulnerable countries. 
In broad terms, general SDR allocations are intended to 
meet a global need: a reserve shortfall of a broad group of 
IMF members. The allocation must receive broad support 
from the IMF’s membership (an 85% majority of the total 
voting power).2 The amount to be issued is based on an 
estimate of the reserve needs of non-reserve currency 
issuing countries.3 In particular, for this latest issue, needs 
of between $1.1 billion and $1.9 billion were estimated for 
the period 2020-2025 (of which around 70% would be for 
emerging and developing economies), considering the 
same percentage of SDR coverage as in the 2009 general 
allocation (between 30% and 60% of the total estimated 
needs).4
Once approved, SDR allocations are distributed to IMF 
member countries in proportion to their quota shares at 
the Fund. Thus, based on the current quota distribution, 
around 58% of the recently approved general allocation 
will go to advanced economies, 39% to emerging 
Box 2
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economies and the remaining 3% to low-income 
countries, which are those most likely to use the SDRs 
(see Chart 1). In any event, as can be seen in Charts 2 and 
3, there are notable cross-country differences in terms of 
the amount of new SDRs to be received as a proportion of 
countries’ international reserves or short-term debt.
The immediate impact of the SDRs allocated will be to 
strengthen reserve assets among IMF member countries. 
However, among other uses, they may also enable these 
countries to obtain international liquidity at low interest 
rates (by exchanging them for other freely usable 
currencies), to smooth balance of payment adjustment 
processes, or to pay off external debt and debt with the 
IMF. In this respect, a general SDR allocation on the scale 
of that approved in August may entail a very large volume 
of SDR transactions (sales and purchases) in coming 
years. In this respect, it should be noted that the SDR 
market functions through 32 voluntary trading 
arrangements, entered into by various governments and 
central banks, including the Banco de España and the 
ECB, and that the IMF is currently negotiating new 
arrangements to ensure that it will be possible to satisfy 
the new requests for exchange of SDRs that will ultimately 
be received.5
As indicated above, to expand the beneficial effects of the 
recently approved general SDR allocation, mechanisms 
would have to be established to enable the SDRs allocated 
to economies that are reserve asset issuers or that have 
sound reserve positions to be used by countries that are 
in a more vulnerable position in the current environment. 
In this respect the IMF is contemplating several options.
The first would be to allow economies that have surplus 
SDRs to commit part of their holdings to concessional 
financing to low-income countries, by means of 
voluntary contributions to the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Trust (PRGT). This trust fund is administered by 
the IMF and grants emergency assistance and loans, 
currently at an interest rate of 0%.6 In the first stage of 
the COVID-19 crisis, its capacity was increased by 
some SDR 17.5 billion.
Another option that is gaining importance is the creation 
of a new trust fund to receive SDRs. It would be 
administered by the IMF and dedicated to funding 
structural reforms relating to objectives that the IMF 
regards as macro-critical (including the fight against 
climate change and the digital transformation of the 
economy). This fund would have to be able to reach 
Box 2
THE	IMF’S	RECENT	GENERAL	ALLOCATION	OF	SPECIAL	DRAWING	RIGHTS	AND	THE	OPTIONS	FOR	CHANNELLING	
THEM TO VULNERABLE ECONOMIES (cont’d)
SOURCE: IMF.
a At 31 July 2021.
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Table 1
5	 	On	IMF	estimates,	the	market	absorption	capacity	of	SDRs,	following	the	latest	general	allocation,	will	increase	from	SDR	72.5 billion	at	present	to	
approximately	SDR	290	billion.	This	figure	 includes	an	additional	SDR	50	billion	arising	 from	new	voluntary	arrangements	 to	be	entered	 into	with	
members	that	enjoy	a	sound	financial	position.
6	 	With	grace	periods	of	4	to	5.5	years	and	maturities	of	8	to	10	years	according	to	the	credit	facility.
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vulnerable medium-income countries that are subject to 
an IMF program, including certain Latin American 
countries that have been particularly hard hit by the 
present crisis. One of the advantages of such a fund 
would be that it could provide additional long-term funding 
at a lower cost than that of conventional IMF lending.
Lastly, a further option being considered – although still at 
a very early stage of development – would be to channel 
surplus SDRs held by some countries into multilateral 
development banks and other institutions that the IMF 
designates as prescribed holders. However, this option 
gives rise to questions about the technical feasibility of 
concessional funding that circumvents IMF 
intermediation.7
The design of all these points, which must be defined in 
order to formalise any of the options considered, poses 
numerous – political and technical8 – challenges that will 
have to be addressed in the coming months. The success 
of this task will determine the extent to which the recently 
issued SDRs can be channelled to the member countries 
that most need them and that have less room for 
manoeuvre for recovery support policies.
Box 2
THE	IMF’S	RECENT	GENERAL	ALLOCATION	OF	SPECIAL	DRAWING	RIGHTS	AND	THE	OPTIONS	FOR	CHANNELLING	





a Countries not included in Chart 3 because short-term debt is negligible or there are no data available.
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Since the end of 2020, manufacturing in the euro area and 
other advanced economies has been facing increasing 
disruption in its productive processes. In addition to 
upward pressure on commodity prices, the rapid recovery 
in global demand has led to input supply problems in 
industries such as semiconductors, chemical products, 
plastics, wood and industrial metals. These difficulties are 
being compounded by strains in shipping.1 Against this 
background, the euro area economies, which are heavily 
dependent on imports of raw materials and intermediate 
inputs for their productive processes, face a shortage of 
basic components. This shortage is generating production 
bottlenecks, which are preventing supply from meeting 
the demand from orders within the required time periods.2
These mismatches are largely a result of the rapid recovery 
in demand and changes in consumption patterns. 
Consumption is being driven by the gradual easing of the 
restrictions imposed to contain the spread of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, vaccination progress and the 
reopening of the services sector. Also, the demand for 
some manufactured products has strengthened 
enormously during the pandemic. Thus, for example, the 
greater need for digitalisation in the workplace, education 
and the home boosted purchases of electronic devices, 
while reduced mobility and the fall in spending on certain 
services − primarily as a result of the pandemic 
containment measures − prompted a shift in private 
consumption towards purchases of goods, especially 
durable household equipment. 
As seen in Chart 1, these bottlenecks are reflected in PMI 
indicators of suppliers’ delivery times, which have 
experienced an increase that is unprecedented in the euro 
area and in European Commission surveys. According to 
this latter source, the percentage of euro area 
manufacturing firms facing material and/or equipment 
shortages reached an all-time high in July, of almost 40%, 
well above the 7% level recorded at the end of 2020 and 
the levels of recent years. On the evidence available, 
these restrictions mainly relate to supply difficulties along 
the value chain rather than to capacity limits. Thus, 
although capacity utilisation in manufacturing has 
recovered rapidly in recent months and exceeds its 
historical average across a broad swathe of industries, it 
is still within the normal range observed in the past (see 
Chart 2). In any case, as a consequence of these 
developments, stocks of finished products in the euro 
area have also declined to historically very low levels in 
recent months (see Chart 3).
By country, bottlenecks have affected the German 
economy especially severely (see Chart 4). In particular, in 
July, 70% of German manufacturing firms was constrained 
by material and/or equipment shortages, well above the 
42% level observed in April and the normal historical 
range for this variable. And this was against a background 
in which only 12% of German firms reported a lack of 
demand in July. In the other major euro area economies, 
although the shortage of material and/or equipment is not 
proving to be the key limiting factor for firms, its importance 
is increasing and the percentage of firms affected by this 
factor stands significantly above its historical average.3 
Thus, for example, in Spain, 22% of surveyed firms 
reported supply restrictions associated with material and/
or equipment shortages in July (as against 13% in April), 
while 37% considered lack of demand to be a factor 
limiting their production. 
These developments arise against a backdrop of 
strengthening demand. As shown in Chart 4 (right-hand 
side), the percentage of firms affected by insufficient 
demand has dropped substantially in recent months, 
across countries, to stand at the lower end of available 
historical data.
Among the manufacturing industries with the greatest 
economic weight, bottlenecks have emerged earlier and 
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Box 3
EURO	AREA	MANUFACTURING	BOTTLENECKS	(cont’d)
manufacture of electrical equipment, computer and 
electronic products, rubber and plastic products, as well 
as in the chemical industry. These supply constraints have 
been passed through to the rest of the economy, 
particularly in Germany. In this connection, the heat map 
shown in Table 1 shows the industries hardest hit by these 
bottlenecks, i.e. those in which the percentage of firms 
facing material and/or equipment shortages exceeds a 
specific country threshold. This threshold is determined 
by taking the historical average value of this percentage 
SOURCES: European Commission, Markit and Banco de España.
a Inverted left-hand scale. An increase denotes a delay in suppliers' material delivery times.
b Shows the percentage of firms reporting a "shortage of material and/or equipment" as a key limiting factor for their production.
c Measured as a net percentage, i.e. the difference between "excessive" and "insufficient" responses to the question on the level of the stock of 
finished products, as a percentage of all responses.
d In the case of France, the European Commission data do not reflect the problem of a shortage of material which also exists in French manufacturing 
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for the country’s economy as a whole plus three standard 
deviations. According to this criterion, in July, the hardest 
hit sectors accounted for nearly 80% of euro area 
manufacturing GVA, compared with 50% in April. By 
country, the sectors with the greatest constraints in July 
had a weight in total manufacturing GVA of around 90% in 
Germany, 75% in Italy and 45% in Spain, compared with 
60%, 55% and 30% in April, respectively. 
Box 3
EURO	AREA	MANUFACTURING	BOTTLENECKS	(cont’d)
SOURCES: European Commission and Banco de España
a Figures are only shown for industries suffering significant constraints associated with a shortage of material and-or equipment. Such industries are 
considered to be those in which the percentage of firms indicating problems of shortage of material and/or equipment in the July 2021 survey is 
above the historic mean plus three standard deviations for the country as a whole. According to this criterion, the threshold is 22% for the euro area, 
38% for Germany, 6% for Italy and 14% for Spain. The colour shade depends on the distance of the value from the historic mean. The share of the 
industry refers to its share in manufacturing GVA between 2017 and 2019, depending on data availability. France is omitted because, as indicated 
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Box 3
EURO	AREA	MANUFACTURING	BOTTLENECKS	(cont’d)
Naturally, the constraints by country and industry shown 
in Table 1 reflect, to some degree, the considerable 
propagation of supply and demand mismatches across 
industries and countries observed in recent months. To 
illustrate the importance of this propagation channel, 
Chart 5 shows, using input-output tables, the value 
added generated in constrained sectors in Germany that 
is incorporated into manufacturing output in Spain and 
SOURCES: European Commission (EC), Eurostat, Markit, OECD and Banco de España.
a Dependence is measured as value added generated in Germany that is incorporated into the final demand of the countries in question. The blue 
bars show value added from the German car industry incorporated into total manufacturing and car output of other countries, while the red bars 
show value added from other constrained German manufacturing incorporated into the same aggregates.
b Aggregate production is obtained as the weighted sum of the Industrial Production Index (IPI) for each sector using their weight in the euro area 
IPI. For countries, the weight in gross added value (GVA) is used. The sectors considered to be constrained are shown in Table 1 and are those 
in which the percentage of firms facing material and/or equipment shortages exceed a specific country threshold.
c Expectations as to changes in selling prices in the next three months, expressed as a net percentage, i.e. the number of firms indicating an "increase" 
minus those indicating a "decrease" as a proportoin of the total number of replies.
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Italy. This dependence is particularly high in the car 
industry.4
On this evidence, the manufacturing bottlenecks observed 
since end-2020 may have contributed significantly to the 
slowdown in industrial production in the euro area in 2021 
H1. Indeed, as Chart 6 shows, the slowdown in production 
in the industries considered constrained, particularly the 
car industry, has been very marked in the euro area. In line 
with the evidence presented above, these developments 
have been particularly strong in Germany.
In a setting of rapidly growing demand and rising 
commodity and transport prices, supply difficulties have 
led to significant increases in producer prices, although 
these have been highly uneven across industries. 
According to the firms themselves, protracted or rising 
inflationary pressures in the future cannot be ruled out. 
Thus, for example, both the qualitative PMI selling price 
indicators and future price expectations in the European 
Commission’s survey have reached historically high levels 
(see Chart 7). Moreover, the correlation between these 
expectations and the degree of the material and/or 
equipment shortages is positive, suggesting that price 
increase expectations in the euro area are higher in 
industries that are subject to greater constraints (see 
Chart 8).
In short, this box shows how material and/or equipment 
shortages are preventing euro area manufacturing firms from 
fully responding to the rapid recovery in demand, which 
could hinder the economic recovery process. This effect may 
be compounded if the bottlenecks affect other productive 
sectors, particularly the more manufacturing-oriented 
services sectors, such as transport, wholesale trade and 
some professional services.5 These problems are likely to be 
essentially temporary and to gradually fade as demand 
recovers and supply adjusts. However, their persistence 
could lead to mounting upward pressures on prices. 
Box 3
EURO	AREA	MANUFACTURING	BOTTLENECKS	(cont’d)
4	 	Production	in	the	European	car	industry	is	highly	fragmented.	For	more	details	about	the	production	chain	in	this	industry,	see	Box	5,	“The impact of 
the car industry slowdown from a global value chain perspective”,	Quarterly	Report	on	the	Spanish	Economy,	Economic Bulletin, 2/2019,	Banco	de	
España.	For	an	analysis	focused	on	the	European	car	industry,	see	M.	Izquierdo,	E.	Moral,	E.	Prades	and	J.	Quintana	(2021),	“The	propagation	of	
worldwide	sector-specific	shocks”,	Working	Paper	(forthcoming),	Banco	de	España.
5	 	For	Spain,	see	Box 8, “The recent slowdown in activity from a sectoral perspective”,	Quarterly	Report	on	the	Spanish	Economy,	Economic Bulletin, 
4/2019,	Banco	de	España.
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In accordance with Article 127 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the primary 
mandate of the Eurosystem, which is comprised of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central 
banks of the countries which have adopted the euro, is to 
maintain price stability in the euro area as a whole. 
However, the TFEU leaves to the discretion of the ECB the 
exact definition of “price stability” and the manner in 
which it is to be achieved. These two aspects are part of 
what is known as the monetary policy strategy. 
This strategy, as that of the other central banks,1 may be 
updated to adapt to a constantly changing economic and 
financial reality and, at the same time, to incorporate the 
lessons learned from its implementation over time. In this 
regard, the new structural challenges deriving from the fall 
in the equilibrium real interest rates,2 digitalisation, 
globalisation and climate change, among other factors, 
led the Governing Council of the ECB3 to conduct, from 
early 2020, a new review of its monetary policy strategy, 
following the last review in 2003.4
On 8 July 2021, the ECB presented the outcome of this 
review, establishing an updated strategy that will 
determine the orientation of its monetary policy over the 
next few years.5 This box details some of the main 
changes introduced in this review.
First, the ECB’s Governing Council sets a new 2% 
inflation target over the medium term.6 This target is 
symmetric, meaning positive and negative deviations of 
inflation from the reference rate of 2% are equally 
undesirable. Therefore, in comparison with the previous 
definition of this target (an inflation rate below, but close 
to, 2%), the new formulation removes both any ambiguity 
about the numerical inflation target and the possible 
perception of asymmetry regarding the degree of 
tolerance to future positive or negative deviations of 
inflation from the target. 
Second, in order to maintain the symmetry of its inflation 
target, the ECB recognises the importance of taking into 
account, when implementing its monetary policy, the 
implications of the effective lower bound on interest rates. 
This is understood as the level below which a central bank 
cannot reduce its interest rates without causing potentially 
significant distortions to the functioning of the financial 
system, which would prove harmful for the economy as a 
whole. This lower bound − to which the ECB has come 
close in recent years after setting its key interest rates at 
all-time lows (see Chart  1) − reduces the headroom for 
implementing an expansionary monetary policy. Also, the 
aforementioned fall in equilibrium interest rates implies 
that this lower bound might constrain monetary policy 
more frequently in the future.7 Therefore, in recognition of 
the greater impact of this lower bound in the current 
context, the ECB’s new strategy establishes that when 
the economy operates close to that limit, especially 
forceful or persistent monetary policy measures are 
required to avoid negative deviations from the inflation 
target becoming entrenched. This may also imply a 
transitory period in which inflation is moderately above 
the medium-term target of 2%. 
Third, the ECB’s new strategy confirms that the key ECB 
interest rates are the main instrument for the conduct of 
its monetary policy. However, it also establishes that it will 
continue to use forward guidance, asset purchases and 
longer-term refinancing operations, as appropriate, and 
leaves open the possibility of introducing new instruments 









3  The Governing Council is the main decision-making body of the ECB. Its main responsibilities include adopting monetary policy decisions with the aim 
of achieving price stability.
4  See ECB press release “The ECB’s monetary policy strategy”,	of	8	May	2003.






7	 	For	a	detailed	analysis	of	monetary	policy	 in	an	environment	of	 interest	rates	close	to	their	effective	 lower	bounds,	see	Banco	de	España	(2018),	
“Monetary policy design in the medium and long-term”,	Chapter	3,	Annual Report 2018.
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Box	4
REVIEW	OF	THE	EUROPEAN	CENTRAL	BANK’S	MONETARY	POLICY	STRATEGY	(cont’d)
if considered necessary. As regards forward guidance, at 
the meeting of 22 July 2021, the Governing Council 
modified its formulation to adapt it to the new inflation 
target and, in general, to the new strategy. Specifically, 
the new forward guidance establishes that the Governing 
Council expects the key ECB interest rates to remain at 
their present or lower levels until it sees inflation reach 2% 
well ahead of the end of its projection horizon and durably 
for the rest of the projection horizon, and it judges that 
progress in underlying inflation is sufficiently advanced to 
be consistent with inflation stabilising at 2% over the 
medium term. 
As regards the measurement of inflation in the euro area, 
the new strategy confirms that the Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices (HICP) is the most appropriate indicator 
for assessing price stability. However, it recognises the 
advisability of including in the HICP some of the costs 
related to owner-occupied housing, insofar as they are 
indicative of the cost of the consumption basket of many 
households. For this reason, the ECB has recommended 
the inclusion of these costs in the HICP, a process that 
could take several years owing to the technical challenges 
involved. In the meantime, the new strategy establishes 
that, to supplement the HICP, the Governing Council, in its 
monetary policy assessments, will take into account other 
inflation measures that include estimates of the cost of 
owner-occupied housing.
Moreover, the ECB’s Governing Council presented an 
ambitious action plan to continue incorporating climate 
change considerations into its monetary policy framework,8 
since climate change and the transition towards a more 
sustainable economy — a policy priority for the European 
Union —, affect, through multiple channels, both the outlook 
for price stability and the value and the risk profile of the 
assets held on the Eurosystem’s balance sheet. With this 
action plan, the ECB is committed to strengthening its 
analytical capacity in macroeconomic modelling, statistics 
and monetary policy with regard to climate change, and to 
including climate-related considerations in monetary policy 
operations in relation to the disclosure of environmental 
sustainability information, risk assessment, corporate 
sector asset purchases and the collateral framework.
Lastly, the new strategy establishes that the documents 
and reports normally used for communicating the ECB’s 
monetary policy decisions will be complemented by new 
communication instruments, with different layers of 
technical detail, geared towards different population 
segments.9 Thus, the strategy aims to ensure that these 
decisions are better understood not only by experts but 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a End-of-period monthly data.
Chart 1
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8	 	See	ECB	press	release,	“ECB presents action plan to include climate change considerations in its monetary policy strategy”,	of	8	July	2021.
9	 	See,	for	example,	“Our monetary policy statement at a glance”,	of	22	July	2021.
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also by the general public. In the same vein, the ECB’s 
Governing Council seeks to promote various initiatives to 
enhance the Eurosystem’s interaction with the public.10
Turning to the response of the financial markets to the 
new monetary policy strategy, virtually no significant 
movements were observed in the key financial indicators 
on the day it was announced. This apparent lack of 
response could be interpreted as an indication that the 
announced review was essentially in line with the 
expectations of most financial market participants. It may 
also be consistent with the fact that investors need some 
time to fully adjust their monetary policy expectations to 
the new strategy, as observed following the announcement 
of similar strategic changes by other central banks in the 
past.  
Accordingly, since the announcement, investors’ 
expectations about the future path of interest rates and 
inflation in the euro area, proxied by their respective 
“forward curves”11, have evolved as would be expected 
following the changes in the ECB’s strategy and forward 
guidance. Thus, the EONIA instantaneous forward curve 
would indicate a delay in the expected date of the first 
increase in rates by the ECB (see Chart  2), while the 
inflation forward curve has shifted slightly upwards (see 
Chart 3). Both these developments would be consistent 
with the fact that the new strategy includes an inflation 
target which is somewhat higher than that previously 
envisaged and which removes any perceived asymmetry 
of the previous target, and the fact that the new forward 
guidance sets out more demanding conditions, in terms 
of adjusting inflation to the new target, for the ECB to start 
raising its interest rates. In any event, it is important to 
note that, in recent weeks, a number of macrofinancial, 
geopolitical and epidemiological developments also 
appear to have affected financial market behaviour and 
investor expectations. Therefore, in the absence of a more 
detailed analysis, the relationship between the 
aforementioned financial market movements and the 
announcement of the ECB’s new strategy and forward 
guidance should be interpreted with due caution, 
particularly in terms of cause and effect.
In short, the ECB’s monetary policy strategy review has 
warranted updating the inflation target and recognising 
the implications of the effective lower bound on interest 
rates when conducting monetary policy in the euro area. 
Box	4
REVIEW	OF	THE	EUROPEAN	CENTRAL	BANK’S	MONETARY	POLICY	STRATEGY	(cont’d)
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Box	4
REVIEW	OF	THE	EUROPEAN	CENTRAL	BANK’S	MONETARY	POLICY	STRATEGY	(cont’d)
These new developments, along with the inclusion of 
more climate-related considerations in the institution’s 
operational framework and the monitoring of owner-
occupied housing costs, seek to improve the ECB’s ability 
to fulfil its price stability mandate in the coming years. In 
any event, the ECB’s Governing Council intends to assess 
periodically the appropriateness of its strategy, with the 
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On data from the Spanish Labour Force Survey (EPA by 
its Spanish initials) relating to 2019  Q4, 19.97  million 
people were employed in the Spanish economy prior to 
the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic: 10.81 million men 
and 9.16  million women. The unemployment rate for 
women stood 3.3 percentage points (pp) higher than that 
for men (15.5% vs 12.2%) and their labour market 
participation rate was 10.7 pp lower (53.5% vs 64.2%). 
Based on data provided by the EPA, this box documents 
the extent to which the COVID-19 crisis has had a 
differential impact by gender on the main variables 
describing developments in the Spanish labour market.1 
To this end, the cumulative impacts to date (the latest EPA 
data relate to 2021 Q2) and their changes over time are 
quantified.
As Chart  1 shows, up to 2021 Q2 the health crisis had 
triggered a sharper increase in the female unemployment 
rate (of 1.8 pp to 17.4%) than the male rate (of 1.2 pp to 
13.4%), widening the female-male unemployment gap 
that existed prior to the onset of the pandemic. However, 
it should be noted that this widening, which was 
particularly marked between end-2019 and end-2020, 
has been narrowing slightly over the last two quarters. 
This differential performance across male and female 
unemployment rates also reflects highly diverse dynamics 
in terms of developments in employment, unemployment 
and participation by gender. For instance, in the initial 
quarters of the crisis the decline in employment and the 
labour force was considerably more pronounced among 
women than men (see Charts  2 and 3, respectively). 
However, since end-2020 women have registered more 
favourable changes than men in terms of both employment 
and labour force. This is particularly evident in labour 
market participation, with the 2021 Q2 figures for women 
already exceeding pre-pandemic levels both in the 
number of individuals and the labour force participation 
rate (see Chart 4). It is precisely the female labour force’s 
greater dynamism in recent quarters that largely explains: 
(i) this group’s above-mentioned poorer unemployment 
rate performance; and (ii) the fact that between 2019 Q4 
and 2021  Q2 the number of unemployed women grew 
faster than that of men (13% vs 8.9%) (see Chart 5). 
The dynamics described in the above paragraphs allow 
us to assess, to some extent, the profound implications of 
the COVID-19 crisis for the Spanish labour market and 
how, in some cases, these have differed between men 
and women. However, a fuller picture of the pandemic-
induced distortions in the Spanish labour market would 
also need to factor in the extraordinary impact on 
employment and on actual hours worked had by use of 
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CHANGE IN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE: DIFFERENCE VS 2019 Q4
pp
1	 	For	a	similar	analysis	relating	to	the	euro	area	labour	market,	see	V.	Botelho	and	P.	Neves	(2021),	“The impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the euro area 
labour market for men and women”,	Economic Bulletin,	4/2021,	European	Central	Bank.
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Box	5
THE	DIFFERENTIAL	IMPACT	BY	GENDER	OF	THE	COVID-19	CRISIS	ON	THE	SPANISH	LABOUR	MARKET	(cont’d)
self-employed, and whether this has been heterogeneous 
across gender. 
In this connection, the evidence available suggests that 
both men and women have benefited very considerably 
from the relatively widespread use of the temporary 
employment retention programmes during this crisis. For 
instance, on average in 2020  Q2, women subject to 
pandemic-related job retention schemes accounted for 
17.9% of all women registered with Social Security, while 
for men that percentage stood at 15.5%. Turning back to 
the EPA data, from 2020  Q2 the percentage of female 
employees working zero hours in a specific week owing to 
a partial halt in work for technical or economic reasons or 
being laid off2 has also been slightly higher than that of 
men (see Chart 6). 
As regards actual hours worked, Chart 7 shows that, 
when considering the median of the distribution of this 
variable for men and women, the fall was particularly 
steep for women in 2020 Q2. Since then, the number of 
hours actually worked has behaved somewhat more 
favourably for women than for men, although so far not 
well enough to close the gender gap in this variable that 
emerged after the outbreak of the pandemic. 
Considering the average number of hours worked by men 
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2	 	This	indicator	may	be	considered	a	proxy	for	the	number	of	workers	in	job	retention	schemes	who	are	working	zero	hours.	See	M.	Izquierdo,	S.	Puente	
and	A.	V.	Regil	 (2021),	“Furlough schemes in the COVID-19 crisis: an initial analysis of furloughed employees resuming work”,	Economic Bulletin, 
2/2021,	Banco	de	España.
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the preceding paragraph), the two genders underwent a 
similar fall, of around 20%, between 2019 Q4 and 
2020 Q2. The fact that during this period the hours worked 
by men have decreased much more in average terms than 
in median terms, while for women the fall has been 
virtually the same for these two metrics, is related to the 
differential impact of the COVID-19 crisis at the ends of 
the distributions of actual hours worked by these two 
groups.3 In this regard, considering the scale of the 
changes that have arisen at the ends of these distributions, 
in order to assess the impact of the crisis on the degree of 
worker vulnerability, it seems more appropriate to analyse 
the changes in hours worked in the central portion of 
these distributions, i.e. the median.
Undoubtedly, the steeper decline for women in the number 
of hours worked during this crisis is in part linked to the 
asymmetric impact of the pandemic on the activity of the 
economy’s different productive sectors. Indeed, some of 
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Box	5
THE	DIFFERENTIAL	IMPACT	BY	GENDER	OF	THE	COVID-19	CRISIS	ON	THE	SPANISH	LABOUR	MARKET	(cont’d)
containment measures deployed have a notably high 
relative share of female employment.4 This is particularly 
true of hospitality, retail and arts and recreation services 
(i.e. the social industries),5 where the declines in the median 
total number of hours actually worked versus 2019 Q4 were 
especially sharp for women (see Charts 8 and 9).
In sum, this box documents the impact of the COVID-19 
crisis on the Spanish labour market and throws into relief 
some of the gender asymmetries observed in that impact. 
Specifically, in the first quarters of the crisis, the drop in 
employment, in labour force and in actual hours worked 
was sharper for women than for men. However, since 
end-2020, these variables have behaved somewhat more 
favourably for women. In any event, between 2019 Q4 
and 2021 Q2, gender disparity increased in terms of the 
unemployment rate and actual hours worked, while it 
decreased in terms of the labour force participation rate.
4	 	See	P.	Alvargonzález,	M.	Pidkuyko	and	E.	Villanueva	(2020),	“The financial position of the workers most affected by the pandemic: an analysis drawing 
on the Spanish Survey of Household Finances”,	Analytical	Articles,	Economic Bulletin, 3/2020,	Banco	de	España.
5	 	The	social	industries	comprise	retail,	hospitality,	education,	arts	and	recreation	services,	other	service	activities,	households	as	employers	and	extra-
territorial	organisations	and	bodies.	In	2019	Q4,	47.6%	of	employed	women	worked	in	social	industries,	compared	with	30.5%	of	men.
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Since the outbreak of the pandemic in March 2020, 
restrictions on social interaction have had to be adopted 
on a global scale, in particular to limit personal mobility, 
especially in terms of cross-border travel. As a result, one 
of the most affected areas of economic activity has been 
international tourism, which is especially relevant for 
Spain, where this sector accounts for a large share of 
overall value added and employment. The decline in 
Spain’s tourism exports was particularly marked at the 
onset of the health crisis, between March and May 2020, 
when the state of alert and border closures brought the 
sector’s activity to a complete standstill. Subsequently, 
the persistence of the pandemic has resulted in a recovery 
of tourism flows that is still far from complete, in step with 
the gradual lifting of restrictions (see Chart 1).1
Against this background, the purpose of this box is to offer 
an initial assessment of the changes in inbound tourism in 
Spain during 2021 Q3 (high season, except in the Canary 
Islands). This assessment is necessarily very preliminary, 
as the quarter has not yet ended and only a very limited 
dataset is available. The box first describes the main 
factors that may have influenced the course of the summer 
tourist season. It then outlines the most recent changes in 
the sector’s main activity indicators. Lastly, it briefly 
presents the results of an econometric model providing an 
estimated rate of growth of inbound tourism for Q3 as a 
whole, based on the information available.
In recent months, several opposing factors have 
influenced the course of the summer tourist season. First, 
the progress of vaccination campaigns in Spain and some 
of its main source countries for tourism in the first half of 
the year, the lifting of the state of alarm in early May, the 
opening of international borders to vaccinated tourists in 
June and the entry into force of the EU Digital COVID 
Certificate on 1 July appear to have significantly boosted 
the recovery of tourist flows. Conversely, the spread of the 
COVID-19 Delta variant in Europe at the start of the 
summer, which led some of the main source markets to 
advise against international travel and to introduce 
restrictions for unvaccinated travellers, has adversely 
affected the recovery of international tourism activity.2
To assess the net effect of this set of factors, information 
can be drawn from the official monthly indicators typically 
used to measure inbound tourism in Spain. However, this 
information is only available up to the month of July. It 
therefore has to be supplemented by other higher-
frequency indicators from different sources that allow the 
most recent developments to be analysed.
This body of data points to a considerable upturn in 
inbound tourism in Spain during recent months, as 
compared with the developments observed up to the 
spring of 2020. However, this recovery remained far from 
complete as at July, when activity was still well below pre-
pandemic levels according to the inbound tourist data for 
(i) arrivals from the Inbound Tourism Survey (FRONTUR), 
(ii) hotel overnight stays from the Hotel Occupancy Survey, 
and (iii) spending from the Tourism Expenditure Survey 
(EGATUR) (see Charts 2 and 3).
As mentioned earlier, the data available regarding 
developments over the rest of the summer season comes, 
for the time being, from various high-frequency indicators 
(weekly or daily), which have become increasingly 
important in the monitoring of economic activity since the 
onset of the pandemic. Overall, and with all due caution, 
these indicators suggest that the gradual recovery of 
foreign tourism continued in August. For example, foreign 
card spending in Spain, air traffic, hotel bookings and 
international Internet searches for accommodation in 
Spain all point in that direction (see Chart 4 and 5).3 
The information available for monitoring tourism activity, 
which includes both the traditional monthly indicators 
available up to July and the high-frequency indicators, 
can be used as a starting point for estimating the growth, 
in National Accounts terms, of inbound tourism in Spain in 
2021 Q3. This is done using the usual models for the 
treatment of time series explaining changes in real tourism 
exports based on inbound tourist arrivals (from FRONTUR) 
and their nominal spending (from EGATUR). The 
performance of these two explanatory variables in August 
and September is estimated based on auxiliary models 
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Box 6
RECENT	DEVELOPMENTS	IN	INBOUND	TOURISM	IN	SPAIN	(cont’d)
SOURCES: INE, Banco de España, Aena, CaixaBank, Eurocontrol, Sojern and Destination Insights with Google.
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For example, for inbound tourist arrivals the regressor is 
the high-frequency indicator for passenger numbers on 
international flights (extended to end-September using 
projections based on the expected seat figures for those 
flights). Similarly, to forecast the nominal spending of 
foreign tourists in August and September, the regressor 
used is foreign card spending in Spain, whose trajectory 
is likewise projected to the end of the analysis horizon 
based on different assumptions. 
Chart 6 summarises the results of this exercise. These 
suggest that the increased dynamism recently observed 
in the main indicators for inbound tourism in Spain would 
be consistent with a negative gap between real exports of 
tourism services (in National Accounts terms) in 2019 Q3 
and 2021 Q3 of around 54% (compared with 80.2% in 
2019 Q2 vs 2021 Q2). In any event, as mentioned above, 
these estimates must be approached with particular 
caution, not only because Q3 has not yet ended, but also 
because the information available for the quarter to date 
is still very limited and not always easy to interpret.
Beyond 2021 Q3, the outlook for inbound tourism remains 
highly uncertain. In particular, the future performance of 
tourism-related productive sectors will be determined by 
the course of the pandemic, the extent to which certain 
structural changes materialise in the habits of tourists and 
business travellers (e.g. owing to the wider adoption of 
remote working and new applications reducing the need 
for face-to-face meetings), and the possible lasting 
damage that the prolonged duration of the health crisis 
may have inflicted on firms linked to the sector.
Box 6
RECENT	DEVELOPMENTS	IN	INBOUND	TOURISM	IN	SPAIN	(cont’d)
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In recent months, inflation has soared both in Spain and in 
the vast majority of European economies, beyond 
analysts’ consensus expectations. Thus, for example, 
headline inflation in Spain rose for the sixth consecutive 
month, to stand at 3.3% year-on-year in August, the 
highest rate recorded since October 2012 (see Chart 1). 
Core inflation increased to 0.6% in August, 0.7 pp higher 
than that observed at end-2020. Other advanced 
economies and, in particular, the whole of the euro area 
experienced similar inflation dynamics, albeit of varying 
intensity (see Chart 2).
This box describes the main factors behind the recent 
inflation developments in Spain and analyses the extent to 
which these and other aspects may influence price 
behaviour in the coming quarters. Looking ahead, also 
examined is the question of how persistent the high inflation 
rates observed in recent months may be in the future. This 
aspect is particularly significant in terms of future 
developments in household disposable income and, at the 
euro area level, for the conduct of monetary policy.
The rise in inflation in Spain in recent months can be 
explained by a number of factors. First, the hike in 
electricity prices, which appears to be mostly associated 
with the rising cost of gas (which, in turn, is linked to 
specific supply distortions and higher demand from Asia) 
and, to a lesser degree, of CO2 emission allowances, as a 
result of the European Union’s more ambitious greenhouse 
gas emission reduction targets in place since 
December 2020.1 Notably, of the 3.9 pp increase observed 
in the HICP between December 2020 and August 2021, 
0.6 pp and 0.2 pp, respectively, would be attributable to 
the direct impact of the rising cost of gas and emission 
allowances on the price of electricity. 
Second, the path of non-electrical energy prices has also 
significantly contributed to the rise in the HICP, reflecting, 
in part, a genuine hike in energy prices associated with 
the strong recovery of global demand in recent quarters. 
However, the recent increase in this component can be 
largely explained by the marked deceleration of energy 
prices from the onset of the pandemic to the summer of 
2020. This generated substantial base effects2 in the 
spring of 2021, which will continue to play a key role in 
headline inflation developments over the rest of the year 
(see Chart  3). Specifically, the base effect of the non-
electrical energy component accumulated since 
February  2021 accounts for 0.8  pp of the year-on-year 
increase in headline inflation recorded in August 2021. In 
any event, the impact of these effects on inflation will 
gradually diminish in the closing months of 2021, fading 
almost entirely by early 2022. 
Another factor that also seems to have contributed to the 
recent increase in inflation in Spain has been the steep 
drops in the prices of many services activities requiring a 
high degree in social interaction, such as hospitality and 
recreation, over the summer of 2020. As with energy 
prices, these developments have also led to highly 
significant base effects, pushing up this inflation 
component in the last two months (see Chart 4).3
Looking ahead, the recent inflationary spike is expected 
to be essentially temporary as a significant part of the 
increase is linked to base effects, and the current high 
rates of change in consumer prices would therefore 
foreseeably decrease gradually over the coming quarters.
That said, the existence of some channels that could 
contribute to making the current bout of inflation more 
persistent should be noted. Specifically, it cannot be ruled 
out that the price rises observed in recent months may 
ultimately prompt further (and possibly longer-lasting) 
increases via indirect and second-round effects. As 
regards indirect effects, the recent hike in electricity prices 
may end up affecting the prices of those goods and 
services that are produced by firms that use this input 





Matías Pacce and Isabel Sánchez
1	 	See	M.	Pacce,	I.	Sánchez	and	M.	Suárez-Varela	(2021)	“Recent developments in Spanish retail electricity prices: the role played by the cost of CO2 
emission allowances and higher gas prices”,	Occasional Paper No	2120,	Banco	de	España.
2	 	The	year-on-year	rate	of	change	in	a	given	month	is	affected	by	the	month-on-month	changes,	be	they	abnormally	low	or	high,	observed	in	the	same	
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Box	7
THE	FACTORS	UNDERLYING	THE	RECENT	INCREASE	IN	INFLATION	IN	SPAIN	(cont’d)
SOURCES: European Commission, Eurostat, INE, Reuters and Banco de España.
a See L. J. Álvarez and I. Sánchez (2018) "Composite indicators of inflationary pressures", Analytical Articles, Economic Bulletin 4/2018, Banco de 
España, for a description of the composite indicators of inflationary pressures.
b Monthly: August 2021; Quarterly: 2021 Q2; Daily: 14 September 2021.
c Inflation expectations of professional forecasters, firms, consumers and inflation swaps.
d Including output gap, capacity utilisation, unemployment rate, quarter-on-quarter change in the unemployment rate, measurement of unemployment 
gap (recession gap) and quarter-on-quarter change in GDP and private consumption.
e Including labour costs, profit margins and domestic producer prices.
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Further, some significant bottlenecks have developed in 
global supply chains since late 2020, which appear to 
have limited the capacity of firms (particularly those in 
manufacturing) to meet growing global demand within the 
timeframes required.5 The impact of such supply and 
demand mismatches has seemingly already been 
reflected in a notable increase in certain intermediate 
goods prices. Thus, throughout 2021, industrial producer 
prices have quickened sharply in Spain, particularly so in 
the case of manufacturing prices of some intermediate 
goods in the basic metals and basic chemicals sectors 
and in the paper industry (see Chart  5). So far, these 
inflationary pressures have not been significantly reflected 
in consumption basket prices, although the empirical 
evidence available would suggest that a relatively small 
part of such pressures could end up passing through, with 
some lag, to the HICP.6 In addition, the frictions observed 
to date in global supply chains could potentially prove to 
be more persistent than expected.
Turning to second-round effects, the recent price 
developments may potentially trigger an increase in 
consumers’ and firms’ future inflation expectations (see 
Chart  6). Were this to put upward pressure on labour 




5	 	See	Box 3 “Euro area manufacturing bottlenecks” in this Economic Bulletin.
6  A recent analysis for the euro area estimates that the pass-through of prices of intermediate goods to those of non-energy industrial goods takes 
between	12	and	18	months	(see	the	box	entitled	“Recent developments in pipeline pressures for non-energy industrial goods inflation in the euro 
area”,	Economic Bulletin 5/2021,	ECB).
7	 	However,	in	the	short	term,	the	strength	of	these	second-round	effects	could	be	relatively	limited,	owing	both	to	the	low	number	of	agreements	with	
indexation clauses in Spain and to the fact that there is still a high degree of slack in the country’s labour market.
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In the third quarter, international financial markets have been influenced by 
the uncertainty surrounding the global economic outlook in the face of the 
increased spread of infection owing to the Delta variant of COVID‑19, 
corporate earnings patterns, and inflationary pressures and their impact on 
expectations for future monetary policy
The	main	stock	market	indices	of	the	advanced	economies	have	risen	in	Q3	to	
date,	underpinned	by	better	than	expected	corporate	earnings,	although	there	
have	also	been	some	brief	falls (see Chart 2.1). The S&P 500 index has risen by 
3.4% since the end of June, reaching new all-time highs in the quarter. Over the 
same period, the EURO STOXX 50 has risen by 3.1%, while the IBEX 35, which is still 
below its pre-pandemic level, has fallen slightly, overshadowed by the negative 
impact that the spread of the Delta variant as had on firms in the tourism and leisure 
sectors which account for a comparatively large share of the Spanish index.
After	falling	at	the	start	of	the	quarter,	long-term	sovereign	debt	yields	in	the	
advanced	 economies	 have	 risen	 in	 recent	 weeks,	 reflecting	 the	 uptick	 in	
inflation (see Chart 2.2). The German 10-year sovereign bond yield, which in August 
hit lows not recorded since February of this year, has increased significantly since 
the end of August. Nevertheless, at the cut-off date of this report, it is down 14 basis 
points (bp) on end-June. The US 10-year sovereign bond yield posts a similar 
performance throughout the quarter, with a cumulative decline of 17 bp, despite the 
recent increases that may have been checked, to some extent, by the Chair of the 
Federal Reserve’s cautious message at the Jackson Hole meeting on withdrawing 
the current monetary policy stimulus measures. These factors also appear to have 
affected foreign exchange markets, where the euro has appreciated against the 
dollar since the end of August. In turn, in the euro area, sovereign risk premia have 
remained low throughout the quarter, with a slight increase in Greece (7 bp) and 
Spain (3 bp).
Non-financial	corporations’	credit	risk	spreads	have	remained	relatively	stable	
in	the	advanced	economies	since	the	end	of	June (see Chart 2.3). In general, in 
the advanced economies, non-financial corporations’ long-term bond yields have 
replicated the decline in sovereign bond yields observed in recent months. As 
regards volume of issuance, in the year overall, corporate issuance in the investment-
grade segment remains below the levels recorded in the same period of 2020. This 
probably reflects these firms’ lower funding needs, following the high level of funding 
obtained last year. Cumulative issuance by firms in the high-yield segment continues 
to exceed previous years’ levels in the euro area, although a certain slowdown in 
2	 INTERNATIONAL	FINANCIAL	MARKETS
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issuance was observed over the summer, while in the United States the issuance 
volume is similar to that observed in 2020.
Although	the	monetary	policy	stance	has	begun	to	tighten	in	a	good	number	
of	 emerging	 market	 economies,	 in	 general	 they	 have	 seen	 no	 significant	
financial	market	tension	in	recent	months (see Chart 2.4). In particular, over the 
quarter, net portfolio capital inflows have remained positive on aggregate and there 
has been no significant appreciation of the dollar against emerging market currencies. 
The main stock market indices have risen in Q3, although with some brief corrections associated with the spread of the Delta variant and the possibility 
that the Federal Reserve could start winding down its monetary stimulus measures sooner than expected. Long-term sovereign debt yields in the 
advanced economies are down in the quarter to date, despite having risen in recent weeks. For their part, non-financial corporations’ credit risk spreads 
in these economies have undergone no significant changes in recent months. Also, although the monetary policy stance has begun to tighten in a good 
number of emerging market economies, in general they have seen no significant financial market tension recently. However, in some of these 
economies that are particularly vulnerable, financial conditions have performed less well in recent months.
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Also, during the first eight months of the year, cumulative debt securities issuance in 
emerging market economies was higher than that recorded in the same period of 
both 2019 and 2020. However, some market discrimination has been observed. For 
example, in those economies with more acute fiscal imbalances (such as Brazil) or 
those that have recently experienced greater social and political tension (such as 
Chile and Peru), interest rates on local currency-denominated debt have risen 
significantly and exchange rates have shown greater depreciation.
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3.1 External environment of the euro area
The global economy continued to recover during Q2. However, against a 
backdrop of the spread of the COVID‑19 Delta variant, the divergences in the 
growth outlook between advanced and emerging market economies have 
tended to become more rooted owing to heterogeneity in vaccination rates 
and in the degree of support provided by economic policies. In recent 
months, the persistence of bottlenecks in the global supply chains appears to 
be constraining the buoyancy of activity and generating inflationary pressures.
Global	growth	 remained	stable	 in	Q2,	 largely	 supported	by	 the	progress	 in	
vaccination,	 particularly	 in	 the	 advanced	 economies,	making	 it	 possible	 to	
ease	restrictions	in	the	vast	majority	of	economies	and	to	increase	mobility	
levels (see Charts 3.1 and 3.2). Thus, in Q2 GDP grew quarter-on-quarter by 2% in 
the euro area, 1.6% in the United States and 5% in the United Kingdom, also driven 
in part by ongoing economic policy support. This has not been the case in the 
emerging market economies. The strong rebound in the incidence of the pandemic 
in India led to a 1.2% decline in activity in emerging Asia during Q2. Meanwhile, 
growth slowed in Latin America (to 0.1%),8 mainly owing to idiosyncratic factors 
related to social and political tensions in some countries in the region. 
However, the	pace	of	growth	in	activity	may	have	moderated	in	Q3	in	light	of	
the	rise	in	infections	associated	with	the	spread	of	the	COVID-19	Delta	variant.	
Pointing in this direction are several high-frequency indicators, such as the 
manufacturing PMIs, which in recent months have stabilised and even moderated in 
some economies (see Chart 3.3). These indicators also point to a growing divergence 
in the growth outlook between advanced and emerging market economies – which 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has reflected in its latest projections –, owing 
to the uneven progress in vaccination and the difference in the capacity of fiscal and 
monetary policies to support the recovery. For example, the deterioration of the 
manufacturing sector has been especially evident in emerging Asia, where PMIs fell 
into contractionary territory in August.
The	persistence	of	supply	bottlenecks	also	seems	to	be	conditioning	the	path	
to	 recovery	 in	 activity	 and	 exerting	 upward	 pressure	 on	 prices (see Box  3). 
According to PMI-related information, delivery times in the euro area and the United 
8 Aggregate	 for	Argentina,	Brazil,	Chile,	Colombia,	Mexico	and	Peru,	weighted	by	 the	purchasing	power	parity	
criterion.	For	Argentina,	the	monthly	indicator	of	activity	is	used	as	a	proxy,	as	the	actual	figure	has	not	yet	been	
published	(21 September).	
3 EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY
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Global growth remained stable in Q2, largely supported by the progress in vaccination, making it possible to ease restrictions in the vast 
majority of economies and to increase mobility levels. However, the pace of growth in activity may have moderated in Q3 in light of the rise 
in infections associated with the spread of the COVID-19 Delta variant and the persistence of bottlenecks in the global supply chains. This 
slowdown may be more pronounced in emerging market economies owing to a slower vaccine roll-out and the lower level of support that 
can be expected from their economic policies. Inflation rates have continued to increase globally in recent months, mainly as a result of 
various base effects and the increase in energy, food and some input prices.
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY CONTINUED TO RECOVER IN Q2, ALTHOUGH THE PACE OF ACTIVITY GROWTH MAY HAVE
MODERATED IN Q3
Chart 3
SOURCES: Bloomberg, Google, IHS Markit, Johns Hopkins University - Coronavirus Resource Center, Our World in Data, Thomson 
Reuters and national sources.
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States have been longer in recent months than those recorded at the height of the 
pandemic (see Chart 3.4). This mismatch between supply and demand, which has 
arisen in a setting of rapid recovery in demand and changes in household consumption 
patterns, appears to be the result of the combined action of a broad set of factors. 
These include most notably the shortage of certain components (in particular, 
semiconductors), the existence of certain sectoral mismatches in labour supply and 
the congestion of logistics systems that are essential to world transport owing to the 
adoption of certain measures to curb the pandemic, including the shutdown of ports 
in China. Against this backdrop, also characterised by rising transport costs, 
especially in sea freight transport, growth in world trade slowed in Q2 to 1.3% 
quarter-on-quarter, below the 3.5% increase observed in the preceding quarter. 
Inflation	 rates	 have	 continued	 to	 increase	 globally	 in	 recent	 months	 (see 
Chart  3.5). Driven largely by the base effects deriving from the steep decline in 
certain prices recorded over most of 2020, the rise in oil and other commodity prices 
since 2020 Q2 (see Chart 3.6) and the supply bottlenecks, this increase has been 
particularly marked in the United States where inflation hit its highest point in recent 
decades, with the CPI posting a year-on-year growth rate of 5.3% in August.9 Looking 
forward, the recent stabilisation of oil and other commodity prices – in response to 
the moderation of demand and, in the case of oil, to the recent announcement by 
OPEC+ of their agreement to gradually increase production – should gradually pass 
through to inflation rates. However, as mentioned earlier, the risk of prices rising will 
continue to persist, owing to the relatively slow adjustment of supply to higher 
aggregate demand.
The	monetary	policy	stance,	which	continues	to	be	exceptionally	expansionary	
in	 the	 advanced	economies,	 has	 started	 to	 tighten	 in	 the	 emerging	market	
economies.	Thus, in recent months, a large number of central banks have started a 
cycle of interest rate hikes to control inflation and contain depreciation pressures on 
their currencies. Among the main emerging market economies, only China’s central 
bank has recently relaxed its monetary policy stance to contend with the negative 
impact of the Delta variant on activity. In the advanced economies, monetary policy 
is expected to begin a gradual process of normalisation in the coming months. In 
some cases, such as Norway and New Zealand, this normalisation will foreseeably 
take the form of interest rate rises. However, in others, such as the United States or 
Canada, normalisation is expected to take place, initially, through a lower pace of 
asset purchases by their central banks.
The	fiscal	policies	of	the	advanced	economies	maintain	a	highly	expansionary	
stance. In the United States two multi-year fiscal packages are in the process of 
approval. They focus on public investment, tax cuts for lower-income households 
9 See	F.	Borrallo,	A.	Buesa	and	S.	Párraga,	“La	inflación	en	Estados	Unidos:	evolución	reciente	y	perspectivas”,	
Analytical	Articles,	Economic	Bulletin,	forthcoming,	Banco	de	España.
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and increases in social benefits, and could entail an additional fiscal stimulus of 
0.5% and 1.1% of GDP in 2022 and 2023, respectively. For its part, in August the 
European Union carried out the first disbursements of aid under the Recovery and 
Resilience Facility of the Next Generation EU programme. In addition, again in 
August, the IMF completed its largest ever general allocation of special drawing 
rights (SDRs), which could provide significant support for the economies hardest hit 
by the pandemic (see Box 2).
3.2 The euro area
In the euro area, the headway made in the vaccination process has made it 
possible to contain the most adverse effects of the spread of the COVID‑19 
Delta variant and consolidate the economic recovery in Q3. However, the 
disruptions that have taken place in the global production and distribution 
chains are limiting industry growth. Inflation continues on a rising trajectory, 
largely owing to temporary factors whose effects will tend to dissipate in early 
2022. In this connection, the high degree of slack still prevailing in the labour 
market makes it unlikely that second‑round effects will arise or that, along 
with these, significant core inflationary pressures will crop up.
Economic	 activity	 in	 the	 euro	 area	 rebounded	 sharply	 in	 Q2,	 against	 a	
background	 where	 headway	 in	 the	 vaccination	 process	 enabled	 a	 gradual	
easing	of	the	pandemic	containment	measures	and	a	progressive	improvement	
in	 mobility. GDP growth in quarter-on-quarter terms was higher than expected 
(2.2%) and was mainly the result of the strong increase in private consumption (see 
Charts 4.1 and 4.2). The strength of domestic demand underpinned the growth of 
imports which practically offset the boost from exports, giving rise to a very slight 
positive contribution of the external sector to output growth. By sector of activity, the 
positive effect of improved mobility was particularly evident in the services sector, 
while industrial activity felt the impact of the global supply chain bottlenecks 
mentioned above (see Box 3).
The	 qualitative	 indicators	 available	 –	 mainly	 the	 European	 Commission’s	
confidence	surveys	and	the	PMIs	–	suggest	that	the	dynamism	observed	in	
GDP	 in	 Q2	 also	 continued	 in	 the	 summer	 (see Chart  4.3). This relatively 
encouraging course of activity appears to be the result of various factors, not least 
the vaccination progress (which seems to have averted the need for a substantial 
tightening of the pandemic containment measures adopted to address the 
significant increase in infections derived from the spread of the Delta variant), the 
recovery in employment and disposable income, and the normalisation of the saving 
rate. By contrast, as already mentioned, the persistent global supply chain 
bottlenecks appear to be hampering industrial activity’s response to the robust 
recovery in demand. 
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In	its	September	Macroeconomic	Projection	Exercise	(MPE),	the	ECB	forecasts	
euro	 area	 GDP	 growth	 of	 5%,	 4.6%	 and	 2.1%	 in	 2021,	 2022	 and	 2023,	
respectively.10 Compared with the previous June exercise, the latest projections 
represent a significant upward revision, of 0.4 pp, in the annual average growth for 
2021, owing to opposing factors. On the one hand, the surprise economic growth in 
Q2 and the existence of a more buoyant international environment. On the other, a 
somewhat less dynamic short-term outlook for the euro area, on account of 
epidemiological developments being slightly worse than foreseen some months 
ago, and the greater persistence of industry bottlenecks. In the medium term, the 
projections continue to assume that the area’s economy will grow above potential 
for the entire projection horizon, in part as a result of maintaining expansionary fiscal 
and monetary policies, which will be conducive to gradually closing the output gap. 
Overall, the ECB’s projections are slightly more optimistic than those drawn up by 
other international organisations and private institutions, although these latter 
forecasts are less recent (see Table 2). This notwithstanding, the monetary authority 
considers the risks surrounding the economic outlook to be balanced. Economic 
growth may be stronger than expected if consumer spending is higher than projected 
10 See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202109_ecbstaff~1f59a501e2.en.html.
Driven by private consumption, economic activity in the euro area rebounded sharply in Q2, against a background where headway in the 
vaccination process enabled the pandemic containment measures to be gradually eased and mobility to progressively improve. The 
qualitative indicators available — mainly the European Commission's confidence surveys and the PMIs — suggest that the dynamism 
observed in GDP in Q2 also continued in the summer.
THE RECOVERY OF ACTIVITY IN THE EURO AREA TAKES ROOT
Chart 4
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and the epidemiological situation improves more quickly. On the other hand, growth 
could be lower than projected if the pandemic worsens or if supply constraints 
persist and have an adverse impact on output. 
At	the	cut-off	date	for	this	report,	the	European	Council	had	already	approved	
18	national	recovery	and	resilience	plans	(RRPs).	This has helped clarify some of 
the doubts raised before the summer as to the implementation of this programme, 
and paved the way for the first disbursements (amounting to €49.1 billion, or 12% of 
the total requested) for twelve countries, including Spain, France, Italy and Germany. 
Subsequent payments are subject to Member States’ adherence to the investment 
and reform agendas agreed in their respective RRPs.
Headline	 inflation	 has	 seen	 strong	 rises	 in	 recent	 months,	 attributable	 to	
factors	 that	 will	 foreseeably	 be	 essentially	 temporary	 and	 reverse	 in	 early	
2022.	 In August, this increase pushed the annual rate of change in the headline 
index to 3%, while core inflation also rose to 1.6% (see Chart 5.1). Changes in inflation 
since the start of the year have been shaped by several idiosyncratic and conjunctural 
factors. Notable among these are the reversal of the temporary VAT rate cut in 
Germany in January; the considerable rise in energy and commodity prices from the 
abnormally low levels of last summer; the base effects deriving from the sharp falls 
in the prices of some services observed at the height of the pandemic in 2020; and 
the change in the HICP weights at the start of the year (see Chart 5.2). Added to 
these is the impact (whose duration is more uncertain) of the global value chain 
disruptions on industrial prices in Q3, and the potential spillover to consumer prices 
over the coming quarters.
While	 the	 economic	 recovery	 and	 the	 factors	 described	 above	 have	 lent	
greater	dynamism	to	inflation,	the	high	degree	of	slack	still	remaining	in	the	
economy	 does	 not	 augur	 significant	 inflationary	 pressures	 in	 the	 medium	
EURO AREA GDP AND HICP GROWTH FORECASTS (a)
Table 2
SOURCES: ECB, European Commission, Consensus Forecast, IMF and OECD.
a In brackets is the change with respect to the previous forecast, which was June for the ECB, May for the European Commission, March for the 
OECD, April for the IMF, July for Consensus Forecast and April for the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
GDP HICP GDP HICP GDP HICP
)1.0( 5.1)0( 1.2)2.0( 7.1)1.0-( 6.4)3.0( 2.2)4.0( 0.5)1202 rebmetpeS( BCE
)1.0( 4.1)1.0( 5.4)2.0( 9.1)5.0( 8.4)1202 yluJ( noissimmoC naeporuE
)…( 3.1)6.0( 4.4)…( 8.1)4.0( 3.4)1202 yaM( DCEO
)1.0( 3.1)5.0( 3.4)4.0( 8.1)2.0( 6.4)1202 yluJ( FMI
)1.0( 5.1)0( 4.4)2.0( 1.2)2.0( 8.4)1202 tsuguA( tsaceroF susnesnoC
Survey of Professional Forecasters (July 2021) 4.7 (0.5) 1.9 (0.3) 4.6 (0.5) 1.5 (0.2) 2.1 (0.2) 1.5 (0)
320222021202
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term.	Thus, the September MPE expects the annual average inflation rate to rise to 
2.2% in 2021 (up from 0.3% in 2020) and to subsequently ease to 1.7% in 2022 and 
1.5% in 2023 (see Table 2). In recognition of energy prices’ prominent role in the 
changes in headline inflation this year, the projections point to a significantly more 
modest increase, to 1.3%, in core inflation in 2021. This rate is expected to gradually 
rise over the coming years (1.4% in 2022 and 1.5% in 2023) as the economic recovery 
takes hold and the output gap closes. The ECB’s inflation projections appear to be 
slightly higher than those published by other international organisations and private 
institutions. However, as the latter projections pre-date those of the ECB, they do 
not appear to fully capture the acceleration in inflation observed in the summer (see 
Table  2). Inflation expectation indicators, which can be compiled by drawing on 
changes in certain financial instruments, suggest that, despite a recent significant 
increase, these expectations remain at moderate levels and are still some way off 
the medium-term reference of 2% (see Chart 5.3).
At	its	latest	monetary	policy	meeting	in	September,	the	ECB	Governing	Council	
decided	 to	 reduce	moderately	 the	pace	of	net	asset	purchases	carried	out	
under	the	pandemic	emergency	purchase	programme	(PEPP)	compared	with	
that	in	the	two	foregoing	quarters. In the press conference held afterwards, ECB 
Headline inflation has seen strong increases in recent months, driven chiefly by the energy component and, to a lesser extent, by the 
nonenergy industrial goods and services components. Nevertheless, a very significant part of this increase appears to be attributable to 
various idiosyncratic and conjunctural factors that will foreseeably be essentially temporary and reverse in early 2022. In this regard, the high 
degree of slack still remaining in the economy does not augur significant inflationary pressures in the medium term.
EURO AREA INFLATION HAS REMAINED ON A RISING TRAJECTORY IN RECENT MONTHS
Chart 5
SOURCES: Bloomberg, Eurostat and ECB.
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President Christine Lagarde commented that this decision was a recalibration of the 
programme, not the start of a plan to gradually reduce net asset purchases (tapering). 
The Governing Council maintained the key interest rates unchanged and confirmed 
the forward guidance on their likely future evolution, as agreed at the July meeting 
following the recent monetary policy strategy review, to support the symmetry of the 
2% inflation target (see Box 4).
Borrowing	costs	remain	at	record-low	levels,	while	the	supply	of	bank	credit	
in	Q2	performed	more	favourably	than	in	previous	quarters. The average costs 
of new bank loans to the private non-financial sector in the euro area have remained 
virtually stable in recent months, whereas interest rates on long-term debt security 
issuances for firms have fallen since May, in keeping with the decrease observed in 
sovereign debt yields (see Chart 6.1). Meanwhile, on the Bank Lending Survey (BLS), 
following the tightening of previous quarters, credit standards remained largely 
unchanged in 2021 Q2, reflecting in part the improved macroeconomic outlook (see 
Chart 6.2). In addition, if banks’ expectations prove accurate, this apparent stability 
in credit standards may have continued in Q3.
Average interest rates on bank financing have remained virtually stable in recent months, whereas the cost for firms of long-term debt security 
issuances has declined since May, in keeping with changes in long-term sovereign debt yields. According to the Bank Lending Survey, credit 
standards remained largely unchanged in 2021 Q2 and, if banks' expectations prove accurate, this trend may have continued in Q3.
FINANCING COSTS CONTINUE TO BE AT VERY LOW LEVELS, AND CREDIT STANDARDS REMAINED LARGELY UNCHANGED
IN 2021 Q2
Chart 6
SOURCES: Refinitiv Datastream and ECB.
a Bank lending rates are NDERs (narrowly defined effective rates), i.e. they exclude related charges, such as repayment insurance premiums 
and fees. They are also trend-cycle interest rates, i.e. they are adjusted for seasonal and irregular components (small changes in the series 
with no recognisable pattern in terms of periodicity or trend).
b Indicator = percentage of banks that have tightened their standards considerably × 1 + percentage of banks that have tightened their 
standards somewhat × 1/2 – percentage of banks that have eased their credit standards somewhat × 1/2 – percentage of banks that 
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In	 terms	 of	 volume,	 funding	 raised	 by	 the	 private	 non-financial	 sector	 has	
performed	unevenly	in	recent	months,	with	financing	for	households	behaving	
more	 dynamically. Thus, the pace of credit growth in this segment has seen a 
moderate increase, driven by the recovery in consumer credit − which has begun to 
post positive quarter-on-quarter rates of change − and by the greater buoyancy 
shown by lending for other purposes, while growth in financing for house purchase 
has remained stable. For its part, the growth rate in business lending has declined in 
recent months as a result of the slowdown in bank loans.
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In recent months, financing conditions have remained comfortable
In	Q3	 to	date,	 the	 IBEX-35	has	performed	 less	 favourably	 than	most	major	
international	stock	market	indices. In this period, the Spanish index, which has 
posted a slight fall (-0.5%) compared with the revaluation of the EURO STOXX 50 
(3.1%), has been held back by the greater weight and worse relative performance of 
the sectors hardest hit by the spread of the COVID-19 Delta variant during the 
summer, such as leisure and tourism.
The	Spanish	long-term	sovereign	bond	yield	has	declined	slightly.	Although the 
yield on this asset has decreased in Q3 so far, in overall terms, it has risen since end-
August, in keeping with the pattern observed in other advanced economies’ 
sovereign bond markets. The yield spread between the Spanish and German ten-
year bond has increased by 3 bp since end-June, to stand at 65 bp at the cut-off 
date of this Report. As for debt issued by non-financial corporations, the interest 
rate on long-term bonds has generally replicated developments in the sovereign 
bond yield observed in recent months. One-year EURIBOR has remained virtually 
unchanged in the same period.
The	average	cost	of	bank	loans	to	households	and	firms	stands	close	to	its	
historical	 low,	 while	 credit	 standards	 are	 reportedly	 no	 longer	 tightening. 
According to the BLS, credit standards remained unchanged in Q2 and, if institutions’ 
expectations are met, they will remain so in Q3. This breaks the tightening trend 
observed in previous quarters and partly reflects the improved macroeconomic 
outlook (see Chart 7.1). Average interest rates on new bank lending to sole proprietors 
and on loans for house purchase have fallen slightly in recent months (see Chart 7.2). 
In all other segments, the cost of bank lending has hardly changed over the recent 
period.
The Spanish economy picked up notably in Q2, as a result of progress in the 
vaccination campaign and the easing of some of the pandemic containment 
measures in place
GDP	rose	by	2.8%	in	Spain	in	Q2,	after	the	decline	posted	in	Q1.	This growth 
was driven by the progress made in the vaccination campaign and by the improvement 
in the epidemiological situation during the spring, both of which factors allowed for 
some of the pandemic containment measures still in place to be eased and, in some 
cases, even lifted. Following this growth, which was somewhat higher than that 
4 THE SPANISH ECONOMY
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envisaged in the baseline scenario of the Banco de España projection exercise 
published in June (2.2%),11 Spanish GDP stood 6.8% below the end-2019 figure, a 




external	 demand	 made	 a	 negative	 contribution	 to	 growth. In Q2, private 
consumption grew by 6.5% in quarter-on-quarter terms. This growth, which is higher 
than that suggested by the main benchmark indicators for this demand component 
at the June projection cut-off date, may be consistent with the fact that households 
significantly increased their propensity to spend on current goods and services 
11 See	 Box  1,	 “Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2021-2023): the Banco de España’s 
contribution	 to	 the	 Eurosystem’s	 June  2021	 joint	 forecasting	 exercise”,	 “Quarterly	 report	 on	 the	 Spanish	
economy”,	Economic Bulletin,	2/2021,	Banco	de	España.
In recent months, interest rates on new bank lending have held at historically low levels, with slight declines in some segments. The average 
cost of issuance of non-financial corporations’ long-term debt securities has declined since May, in line with developments in sovereign bond 
yields over the same horizon. According to the BLS, credit standards remained unchanged in Q2 across all segments. Lenders expect this 
to continue into Q3.
FINANCING CONDITIONS REMAIN COMFORTABLE AND CREDIT STANDARDS APPEAR TO HAVE HELD UNCHANGED IN Q2
Chart 7
SOURCES: Banco de España and Refinitiv Datastream.
a Indicator = percentage of banks that have tightened credit standards considerably × 1 + percentage of banks that have tightened credit 
standards somewhat × 1/2 – percentage of banks that have eased credit standards somewhat × 1/2 – percentage of banks that have 
eased credit standards considerably × 1.
b Bank lending rates are NDERs (narrowly defined effective rates), i.e. they exclude related charges, such as repayment insurance premiums 
and fees. They are also trend-cycle interest rates, i.e. they are adjusted for seasonal and irregular components (small changes in the series 
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against a background of an improving economic and health outlook (see Chart 8.3). 
Conversely, residential investment and investment in capital goods fell unexpectedly 
in this period (by -5.6% and -1.7%, respectively). The decline in residential investment 
could be due to the temporary loss of pace in housebuilding activity for which 
permits had been issued in previous quarters. In the case of investment in capital 
goods, the fall could be related to the somewhat lower production expectations of 
industrial firms, possibly influenced by the input supply problems observed in some 
Spanish GDP grew 2.8% in Q2, benefiting from headway in the vaccination campaign and the improving epidemiological situation, allowing 
some of the remaining pandemic containment measures to be eased. This growth, which outstripped that observed in the euro area overall 
(2.2% in Q2), was driven by strong momentum in private consumption. On the supply side, the highest growth rates between April and June 
were posted by the sectors of activity most affected by the pandemic containment measures during recent quarters.
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY PICKED UP SIGNIFICANTLY IN 2021 Q2
Chart 8
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sectors.12 The negative contribution of net external demand to output growth was 
the result of a substantially higher increase in imports than in exports. On the supply 
side, against a backdrop of easing of the pandemic containment measures, the 
highest growth rates between April and June were posted by the sectors of activity, 
such as retail, transport, hospitality and other leisure-related sectors, most affected 
by these measures during recent quarters (see Chart 8.4). 




possible	 slowdown	 in	 growth. The favourable assessment of the quarter as a 
whole is underpinned by the positive developments in recent months in employment 
and household consumption indicators, and also in confidence indicators, which 
remain at relatively high levels, although their upward trend has recently been 
interrupted. Similarly, the EBAE, based on information compiled up to mid-
September, suggests that business turnover will show similar growth in Q3 to that 
observed in Q2, albeit somewhat below business expectations in June.13 Various 
high-frequency indicators proxying mobility and energy demand dynamics suggest 
that these have not undergone any additional improvements in recent weeks (see 
Chart 9). In line with the information provided by this broad range of indicators, the 
Banco de España’s latest projections14 envisage GDP growth of 2.7% between July 
and September, again on account of the expansionary behaviour of domestic 
demand. 
Employment has remained highly buoyant in Q3
Following	the	sharp	rebound	in	Q2,	effective	social	security	registrations	held	
on	a	progressively	improving	path	during	the	summer	months. Thus, while in 
Q2 they were on average 3.9% below their pre-crisis level, this gap narrowed to 
1.5% in August (see Chart 10.1). This is the result of both the ongoing decline in the 
number of workers on furlough (to an average of 277,905 in August, down nearly 
650,000 from the record high of February) and the improvement in total social 
security registrations. In this respect, total social security registrations in July and 
August outperformed the historical norms for these months, although, on a seasonally 
adjusted basis, this growth was somewhat below that recorded in June. As a result, 
the level of total social security registrations in August was barely 0.1% below that 
12 See	Box 3	of	this	Report,	“Euro area manufacturing bottlenecks”.
13 See	M.	Izquierdo	(2021),	“Encuesta a las empresas españolas sobre la evolución de su actividad: septiembre de 
2021”,	Economic	Notes,	Economic Bulletin,	3/2021,	Banco	de	España.
14 See	Box 1	of	this	Report,	“Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2021-2023)”.
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observed in February 2020. By sector of activity, employment has in recent months 
performed most favourably in some of the sectors that had fared worse since the 
onset of the pandemic, such as hospitality. In any event, occupation in such sectors 
is still very far from pre-pandemic levels (see Chart 10.2).
These	developments	in	employment	would	be	consistent	with	an	increase	in	
hours	 worked	 and	 a	 decline	 in	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 in	 Q3. Specifically, 
A broad range of indicators suggest that, in Q3 overall, economic activity remained considerably buoyant, similar to the previous quarter, 
although some signs of a slowdown have recently been evident. In particular, various high-frequency indicators proxying mobility and energy 
demand dynamics suggest that these have not undergone any significant additional improvements in recent weeks.
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO SHOW CONSIDERABLE BOUYANCY IN Q3
Chart 9
SOURCES: Ministerio de Sanidad, Consumo y Bienestar Social, Google, Dirección de Estudios de Repsol, Red Eléctrica de España and 
Banco de España.
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following the 4.4% increase in Q2, total hours worked are set to rise by 2.2% in Q3, 
slightly below the expected growth in GDP. For its part, the unemployment rate is 
expected to fall from 15.3% in Q2 to around 14.5%, against a backdrop of sustained 
recovery in the participation rate.
GDP growth in Q3 will be underpinned by the rise in household consumption 
and in residential and business investment
Private	consumption	appears	to	have	risen	once	again	in	Q3,	albeit	at	a	slower	
pace	 than	 in	Q2. The growth in household consumption in the summer months 
would be consistent with the ongoing improvement in the labour market, sustained 
and relatively high confidence levels (see Chart  11.1) and the evidence from 
developments in domestic spending using credit cards and in expenditure on certain 
services items (see Chart  11.2). In any event, the recent weakness in new car 
registrations and in the retail trade index (see Chart 11.3), together with lacklustre 
In August, total social security registrations increased to stand 0.1% below the level observed in February 2020. Alongside this improvement 
came a drop in the number of workers on furlough, helping to narrow the gap between effective social security registrations and their 
pre-crisis level to -1.5% (compared with -3.9% on average in Q2). By sector, the growth in employment was concentrated in hospitality and 
in arts and recreation services, although employment in these sectors remains far from pre-pandemic levels.
EFFECTIVE SOCIAL SECURITY REGISTRATIONS SUSTAINED A GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT DURING THE SUMMER MONTHS,
WITH SIGNIFICANT GROWTH IN EMPLOYMENT IN HOSPITALITY AND OTHER RECREATION-RELATED SECTORS
Chart 10
SOURCE: Ministerio de Inclusión, Seguridad Social y Migraciones.
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consumer credit in recent months (see Chart 11.4), would suggest that the pace of 
growth of private consumption in Q3 may have slowed somewhat compared with 
that observed in the spring.
Residential	 investment	 seems	 to	 have	 accelerated	 over	 recent	 months.	
Following the decline in Q2, this demand component appears to have adopted a 
more expansionary course during Q3, judging by the information available, which 
This growth would be consistent with the ongoing improvement in the labour market, sustained and relatively high confidence levels and the 
evidence from developments in domestic spending using credit cards and in expenditure on certain services items. However, the recent 
weakness in new car registrations and in the retail trade index, together with lacklustre consumer lending in recent months, would suggest 
that the pace of growth of household consumption in Q3 may be somewhat lower than that observed in Q2.
HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION APPEARS TO HAVE RISEN IN Q3, ALBEIT AT A SLOWER PACE THAN IN Q2
Chart 11
SOURCES: Banco de España, European Commission, IHS Markit and INE.
a Quarter-on-quarter change. Latest observation: August 2021 (new car registrations) and July 2021 (retail trade).
b Bank financing series include financing granted by credit institutions and by specialised lending institutions.
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also suggests a continuation of this greater dynamism in the short term. In this 
respect, the higher volume of new construction, attributable to the increase in the 
pace of growth in permits for such building work in Q2 (see Chart  12.1), is 
particularly noteworthy, as is the relative strength shown by house purchases in 
2021 H1, which were up by more than 9% on the same period in 2019, on notarial 
information. And this against a background of an improving economic and health 
outlook and, in the financial arena, a clear upward trend (albeit one somewhat 
less marked in recent months) in new loans to households for house purchase 
(see Chart 11.4). In keeping with the recovery in activity, house prices quickened 
in Q2 (to 3.3%), thus breaking out of the slowing path they had been on since early 
2019 (see Chart 12.2). 
Having	contracted	in	2021 Q2,	business	investment	appears	to	have	picked	up	
strongly	in	Q3. Pointing in this direction, for example, are the manufacturing PMI, 
which in August posted its highest value since May 1998 (see Chart 13.1), and the 
monthly business survey indicators related to production expectations in this sector 
(see Chart 13.2). Conversely, a growing percentage of Spanish industrial firms have 
in recent months reported limitations to their activity owing to input shortages, which 
could pose a downside risk to their future investment plans (see Chart  13.3). 
Meanwhile, the volume of new business loans has been somewhat stable over recent 
months, remaining below the average levels observed in 2019, whereas debt security 
issuances have rallied (see Chart  13.4). Turning to the financial position of the 
The acceleration of building permits in Q2 and the relative strength shown by house purchases in 2021 H1 would point to greater dynamism 
in residential investment in Q3. In keeping with the recovery in activity, house prices quickened in Q2.
RESIDENTIAL INVESTMENT SEEMS TO HAVE INCREASED IN RECENT MONTHS, FOLLOWING A SHARP CONTRACTION IN Q2
Chart 12
SOURCES: Banco de España, INE and Ministerio de Transportes, Movilidad y Agenda Urbana.
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corporate sector, its debt-to-GDP and debt burden ratios decreased in Q2, on the 
provisional data available. In any event, this decline appears to be the result of the 
increase in GDP, as the volume of corporate debt and interest payments seems to 
have risen slightly. 
The information available suggests that, after contracting in Q2, investment in capital goods and intangibles has risen between July and 
September. Thus, for example, in August the manufacturing PMI posted its highest level since May 1998. However, the fact that a growing 
percentage of Spanish industrial firms have reported that input shortages are limiting their activity could pose a downside risk to their future
investment plans. Meanwhile, the volume of new business loans has been relatively stable over recent months, whereas debt security 
issuances have risen.
THE PERFORMANCE OF BUSINESS INVESTMENT IS EXPECTED TO BE MORE DYNAMIC IN Q3
Chart 13
SOURCES: Banco de España, European Commission, IHS Markit and Ministerio de Industria, Comercio y Turismo.
a The percentages of the responses stating the indicated factors, together with the response “none” (not shown in the chart), sum to 100%.
b Bank financing series include financing granted by credit institutions and by specialised lending institutions.
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International trade flows continue to recover gradually, although tourism 
receipts remain well below their pre‑pandemic levels 
The	 performance	 of	 new	 export	 orders	 and	 intermediate	 goods	 purchases	
from	 the	manufacturing	PMI	suggests	 that	goods	exports	and	 imports	saw	
further	growth	 in	Q3 (see Chart  14.1). Nevertheless, the supply chain problems 
represent risks to the growth capacity of international trade. This is particularly so in 
the case of industries that are more integrated into global value chains, such as the 
car industry, whose exports, which account for a relatively very significant share of 
Spanish exports (10.6% of the total in the last two years), are proving sluggish (see 
Chart 14.2). 
Tourism	exports	appear	to	have	rebounded	strongly	during	the	summer	but	
are	expected	to	remain	far	below	the	 levels	observed	 in	the	same	period	 in	
2019. As detailed in Box 6 of this Report, the latest available data, corresponding to 
July, from the various official monthly indicators usually used to monitor the tourism 
sector point to a very substantial recovery in inbound tourism in Spain in recent 
months. Thanks to this recovery, activity levels in these sectors are estimated to 
have amply exceeded those recorded during 2020 and in the early months of 2021, 
but not to have returned to those observed in other summer campaigns before the 
outbreak of the pandemic. Beyond July, the volume of data available regarding 
developments in the tourism sector is more limited and chiefly sourced from various 
The survey-based indicators anticipate an expansionary course in foreign trade in Q3, although this outlook may be affected by the supply 
problems affecting manufacturing. Car exports have been hit by the shortages of electronic components.
FOREIGN TRADE IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO RECOVER
Chart 14
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high frequency indicators that have become increasingly important in the monitoring 
of economic activity since the onset of the pandemic. While such indicators should 
be interpreted with caution on account of their limitations, the latest developments 
would, overall and broadly speaking, suggest that the recovery in inbound tourism in 
Spain also continued during August.
Public finances performed more favourably in 2021 H1 than in the same 
period of 2020 
During	2021 H1,	the	general	government	deficit,	excluding	local	government,	
fell	by	2.2 pp	of	GDP	compared	with	the	same	period	of	2020. Spurred by the 
recovery in domestic demand, government receipts saw notable growth in the first 
half of the year, to levels exceeding even those observed during the same period of 
2019 (see Chart  15.1). However, behind this aggregate performance lies some 
heterogeneity by item. Thus, compared with 2019 H1 levels, direct taxes and social 
security contributions are up 6.2%, whereas indirect tax revenues are still slightly 
below. Meanwhile, during 2021 H1 public spending fell by 0.5% compared with the 
In the first six months of 2021 the general government deficit, excluding local government, stood at 4% of GDP, 2.2 pp lower than in 2020. 
This was the result of the significant recovery in government revenue and a moderate reduction in expenditure, which is still well above its 
pre-pandemic levels.
IN 2021 H1, THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEFICIT FELL COMPARED WITH THE SAME PERIOD OF 2020
Chart 15
SOURCES: Banco de España, IGAE and Stability Programme 2021-2024 (April 2021).
a Relating to the aggregate for general government, excluding local government and transfers within general government. Corrected for the 
temporary impact of the reversion of several motorway concessions to the State in January 2020 and the reclassification of Sareb under 
general government in December 2020.
b The IGAE only provides quarterly information on general government as a whole. It publishes the data on the total, excluding local 
government, on a monthly basis.
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first six months of 2020, owing partly to the marked decline in disbursements linked 
to the management of the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, 
the level of expenditure is still markedly higher than before the outbreak of the health 
crisis. As a result of these developments in government revenue and spending, the 
general government deficit, excluding local government, stood at 4% of GDP 
between January and June 2021, 2.2 pp lower than in the same period of 2020 (see 
Chart 15.2).
As	 regards	 the	 NGEU	 programme,	 in	 July	 EU	 authorities	 gave	 their	 final	
approval	to	the	Spanish	Recovery,	Transformation	and	Resilience	Plan	(RTRP),	
paving	the	way	for	the	disbursement	of	the	first	EU	funds	in	August. On 13 July, 
the EU Council approved the Spanish RTRP, enabling Spain to receive on 17 August 
the first €9 billion (out of a planned total of €69.5 billion) from the RRF, the centrepiece 
of NGEU. Subsequent payments will be linked to the prior fulfilment of a list of 
milestones (including legislative reforms, strategic plans, reports and the creation of 
new agencies) and targets (such as the signing of agreements, the number of projects 
implemented and the amount spent) specified in the Plan.15
On	the	regulatory	front,	the	Government	approved	a	number	of	temporary	tax	
cuts	to	alleviate	the	impact	on	consumers	of	the	sharp	increases	in	wholesale	
electricity	 prices	 since	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	 year.16 Specifically, a temporary 
reduction in the VAT rate on electricity consumption (from 21% to 10%) until the end 
of 2021 was approved in June, along with a three-month suspension (from July to 
September) of the tax on electricity generation. In September, alongside a broader 
set of measures, the suspension of the tax on electricity generation was extended 
for a further quarter, and the rate of the excise duty on electricity was lowered from 
5.1% to 0.5% until the end of 2021. Taken together, these measures would represent 
a tax cut this year of around 0.1 pp of GDP.
Headline inflation has continued to climb in recent months, driven by energy 
prices and, more recently, by the higher prices of some tourism and 
leisure‑related services 
In	August,	the	year-on-year	growth	rate	of	the	HICP	rose	to	3.3%,	continuing	
the	upward	path	seen	since	late	2020 (see Chart 16.1).17 As detailed in Box 7 of 
this Report, this acceleration in the pace of prices – which appears to have been 
somewhat more marked in Spain than in the euro area as a whole (see Chart 16.2) 
– would mainly reflect the notable hike in energy prices in recent months – which has 
affected electricity, gas and oil (see Chart 16.3) – and, more recently and to a lesser 
15 See Annex	 to	 the	 Proposal	 for	 a	Council	 Implementing	Decision	 on	 the	 approval	 of	 the	 assessment	 of	 the	
recovery and resilience plan for Spain.
16 See	Royal	Decree-Law	12/2021	of	24 June 2021	and	Royal	Decree-Law	17/2021	of	14 September 2021.
17 See	Box 7	of	this	Report,	“The factors underlying the recent increase in inflation in Spain”.
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extent, the higher growth rate of both fresh and processed food prices. 
Core	 inflation,	 i.e.	 HICP	 excluding	 energy	 and	 food,	 has	 also	 increased	 in	
recent	months,	primarily	because	of	the	pick-up	in	services	prices. In particular, 
core inflation, which had posted slightly negative rates during 2021  Q2, stood at 
0.6% year-on-year in August (see Chart 16.4). This acceleration is largely attributable 
to the rise in inflation in some tourism and leisure-related services which can, in turn, 
Headline inflation has continued to rise in Spain in recent months — somewhat more markedly than in the euro area as a whole — driven by 
energy prices and, more recently, to higher tourism- and leisure-related prices. The current high rates of headline inflation are expected to 
decline gradually over the coming quarters as the contribution of the energy component, which is partly affected by significant base effects, 
eases. However, some factors could contribute to making the current inflationary path more persistent and pose an upside risk to analysts' 
consensus inflation forecasts.
INFLATION REMAINS ON AN UPWARD PATH
Chart 16
SOURCES: Banco de España, Eurostat, INE, Red Eléctrica de España and Reuters.
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be explained both by the surge in these prices from July onwards and by the marked 
base effect stemming from their notable decline in the same period of 2020. In any 
event, the rebound in tourism-related prices in recent months has been uneven. 
Thus, while package holiday and air transport prices remain below those seen one 
year ago, hotel prices have already surpassed them. 
The	current	high	rates	of	headline	inflation	are	expected	to	decline	gradually	
over	the	coming	quarters	as	the	contribution	of	the	energy	component,	which	
is	partly	affected	by	significant	base	effects,	eases. Consistent with the gradual 
recovery path expected for economic activity as a whole, it seems likely that in the 
coming months core inflation rates will show a slightly rising pattern. However, given 
the high degree of slack still prevailing in the economy, these rates will foreseeably 
remain below 1% in the short term. In any event, there are factors that could make 
the pick-up in core inflation more pronounced. In particular, it cannot be ruled out 
that the recent increases in energy and commodity prices may end up generating 
additional inflationary pressures through indirect effects (on the prices of goods and 
services produced using such inputs) and second-round effects (via higher wage 
demands, the materialisation of which would raise final prices as a result of the 
higher labour costs). In particular, this would be the case should the frictions 
observed in global supply chains in recent months, which have already led to a 
noticeable rise in intermediate goods prices, prove to be more persistent than 
expected and end up being passed on significantly to consumer prices.
Cut-off date: 14.9.2021. 
Publication date: 21.9.2021.
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OVERVIEW OF GLOBAL AND EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONAL SUSTAINABLE 
FINANCE INITIATIVES
Clara Isabel González Martínez
Published on 8 September 2021
To contribute to the fight against climate change and achieve a carbon-neutral 
economy, a large volume of funds must be mobilised to finance the necessary 
investment. The international financial system will play a key role in this process to 
channel the financing, but considerable changes will be needed to develop 
sustainable financing that is sufficiently standardised and transparent to ensure the 
efficient allocation of funds to activities identified as sustainable. Since the Paris 
Agreement and the 2030 Agenda were signed in 2015, work has been undertaken in 
this respect in various spheres, by the G20, the United Nations, the European 
Commission and central banks, and also in the financial sector. This article describes 
the main – public and private – institutional initiatives under way at the global and the 
European level to achieve the transition needed to address climate change.
THE ROLE OF CENTRAL BANKS IN COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE FINANCE
Clara Isabel González Martínez
Published on 8 September 2021
The consequences of climate change affect both the financial system and the economy 
as a whole. Understanding the attendant risks and meeting the goals of the Paris 
Agreement, so as to restrict the rise in global temperature and mobilise the resources 
needed to achieve a carbon-neutral economy, is a global challenge for the political and 
economic authorities. International cooperation is also a must. Central banks are not 
impervious to these movements and are including on their agendas climate and 
sustainability-related aspects in various areas, both in the management of own portfolios 
and in supervision and financial stability. And it is also being discussed how to include 
these aspects in monetary policy frameworks. While the central role in this arena is, given 
their nature, for governments, central banks may have an important role as catalysts, 
leading by example to contribute to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement. In Europe, 
the European Central Bank (ECB) and the National Central Banks (NCBs), including the 
Banco de España, are working to incorporate these matters into their own business areas.
ANALYTICAL ARTICLES
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CASH INFRASTRUCTURE AND CASH ACCESS VULNERABILITY IN SPAIN
Diana Posada Restrepo
Published on 4 August 2021
The article highlights how the distribution of the cash infrastructure affects cash 
users in Spain. The more cash infrastructures are scaled down and/or concentrated, 
the wider the gap becomes between those who have difficulty accessing cash and 
those who have easy access to it. To assess the coverage of the cash infrastructure 
and, therefore, the level of access to cash throughout Spain, the article examines its 
geographical distribution and concentration. It also analyses whether the distribution 
adequately satisfies the demand for cash, according to the socio-demographic 
characteristics of the different regions of Spain. To this end, a cash access 
vulnerability index is presented, which identifies the municipalities that have a higher 
risk of financial exclusion in terms of access to cash. The index shows that cash 
access vulnerability is low throughout most of Spain, although there are approximately 
1,300,000 people who may be considered vulnerable in this respect.
A COST OF LIVING INDEX FOR SPANISH CITIES
Victor Forte-Campos, Enrique Moral-Benito and Javier Quintana
Published on 2 August 2021
Citizens’ well-being depends both on their income levels and on the cost of living in 
their specific place of residence. However, very limited data are available on 
differences in price levels across geographical areas within a single country. This 
article presents a price index for Spanish urban areas covering the period 2004-
2020. By way of example, according to this index, the cost of living in the two largest 
cities (Madrid and Barcelona) in 2020 was nearly 20% higher than the average of 
other Spanish urban areas. Thus, while average private sector wages in Madrid and 
Barcelona were 45% higher than in other cities, this gap narrows to 21% when wages 
are adjusted to reflect purchasing power.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FINANCING AND BANK LENDING TO THE NON‑
FINANCIAL PRIVATE SECTOR. FIRST HALF OF 2021
Pana Alves, Jorge Galán, Luis Fernández Lafuerza and Eduardo Pérez Asenjo
Published on 28 July 2021
Financing conditions for households and firms remained accommodating in the first 
half of 2021. Improved macroeconomic expectations from the second quarter of the 
year have allowed credit standards to cease tightening, at the same time as demand 
for loans has picked up, particularly among households. This has contributed to an 
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increase in the flow of loans as compared with end-2020, especially loans for house 
purchase. However, up to May (latest available figure) this growth in new financing 
has not translated into an acceleration of total outstanding household and corporate 
debt. In the sectors hardest hit by the pandemic, total outstanding bank lending to 
firms and sole proprietors grew moderately in the initial months of 2021. However, the 
cumulative growth since the onset of the pandemic has been sizeable as a result of 
the hefty liquidity needs in 2020, which were covered through increased debt. The 
significant adverse impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on economic activity is yet to 
be reflected in a broad-based increase in non-performing loans on deposit institutions’ 
balance sheets. However, Stage 2 credit remained on a rising trajectory in 2021 Q1, 
with loans to the hardest-hit sectors of economic activity accounting for the lion’s 
share. Non-performing loans also grew in these sectors, albeit by a lesser amount.
THE IMF´S RESOURCES IN THE FACE OF THE COVID-19 CRISIS
Isabel Garrido, Xavier Serra and Sonsoles Gallego
Published on 23 July 2021
In the year since the onset of the pandemic caused by COVID-19, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF or the Fund) has granted loans and emergency financing to over 
85 countries, an unprecedented number. In the past, a shock on this scale would 
have brought the issue of the sufficiency of its resources centre-stage. However, on 
this occasion, given the characteristics of the loans granted, the IMF’s general 
resources have not been excessively squeezed. Pressure has been greater on the 
concessional resources granted to low-income countries. Against this background, 
the IMF’s general and concessional resources have two different needs to contend 
with. In the case of the former, the IMF has the leeway to respond to any future 
increase in the demand for ordinary financing and, if necessary, it could activate its 
temporary resources. Conversely, in the case of the latter, it must ensure there are 
sufficient resources to avert stiffer concessional financing terms for the most 
vulnerable countries, in what is the most complicated economic juncture of recent 
decades. The IMF should obtain new borrowed resources as these countries 
progressively replace emergency assistance with conditional financing.
IMPACT OF THE COVID‑19 PANDEMIC ON THE SPANISH COMMERCIAL REAL 
ESTATE MARKET
Alejandro Fernández Cerezo, Matías Lamas, Irene Roibás and Raquel Vegas
Published on 21 July 2021
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a major impact on the recent performance of the 
Spanish commercial real estate market. In particular, the crisis has led to a sharp 
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decrease in non-residential investment and has triggered a correction in sale prices, 
transaction numbers and new financing operations. It has also affected Spanish real 
estate investment trusts specialising in this market, both in terms of the number of 
vehicles created and of their stock prices and the value of their real estate assets. By 
contrast, to date there has been no significant deterioration in credit quality linked to 
the commercial real estate market.
THE JULY 2021 BANK LENDING SURVEY IN SPAIN
Álvaro Menéndez Pujadas and Maristela Mulino
Published on 20 July 2021
According to the Bank Lending Survey, in 2021 Q2 the changes in credit standards 
were negligible in Spain and in the euro area, while loan applications increased 
across the board in the two areas. Compared with prior quarters, these more 
favourable developments in loan supply and demand appear to be the result of an 
improved macroeconomic context. The responding banks in the two areas consider 
that the non-performing loan ratio led the supply of credit to firms to tighten somewhat 
in 2021 H1, whereas it barely had an impact on the supply of loans to households. 
Lastly, in 2021 H1 the supply of loans with public guarantees barely changed in 
Spain, while in the euro area it eased slightly. The demand for this type of lending 
decreased in the same period in the two areas.
CONSUMPTION RECOVERY IN 2021: AN ANALYSIS DRAWING ON CONSUMER 
EXPECTATIONS
Pablo Aguilar
Published on 16 July 2021
Consumers’ expectations of economic developments are a fundamental determinant 
of their spending decisions. This article estimates, using simple expectation 
formation rules in the context of a general equilibrium model, the degree of 
persistence that households assign to the economic impact of the pandemic. The 
findings show that households have perceived that the COVID-19 shock has a lower 
degree of persistence than other previous negative shocks. According to the model 
used, this would signal an uptick in private consumption, once the health crisis is 
over, that would tend to offset the decline observed during the pandemic.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 77 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 3/2021  ANALYTICAL ARTICLES
THE IMPACT OF THE EFFICACY OF JUSTICE ON BUSINESS INVESTMENT IN 
SPAIN
Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti
Published on 1 July 2021
One of the main determinants of the level of dynamism of business investment is the 
efficacy of the legal system, as an essential element of the institutional framework of 
an economy. This article sets out an empirical approach to the impact of the efficacy 
of justice on the investment decisions of a sample of Spanish firms. Drawing on the 
cross-provincial heterogeneity in the court congestion rate, and how it changes over 
time, this analysis suggests there is a positive and significant correlation between 
efficacy in the civil justice system and business investment in Spain.
RESULTS OF NON‑FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS IN 2021 Q1
Álvaro Menéndez and Maristela Mulino
Published on 24 June 2021
The information for the sample of firms reporting to the Central Balance Sheet Data 
Office Quarterly Survey evidences that in the first three months of 2021 firms’ activity 
continued to contract compared with 2020 Q1. However, it did so at a far slower 
pace than a year earlier, when the first effects of the COVID-19 crisis made themselves 
felt. Thus, from January to March 2021 there were further reductions, albeit minor, in 
gross value added and gross operating profit, while employment continued to fall 
across the sample as a whole. Nonetheless, lower depreciation and operating 
provisions allowed ordinary net profit to rise and, consequently, profitability indicators 
to recover slightly. The financial position indicators have, on average, shown a far 
more subdued performance than in 2020, with slight increases in the average debt 
ratios and stability in the share of profits used to pay interest. Also evident is a slight 
decline in average liquidity ratios, following the strong increase in the previous year. 
In any event, these aggregate developments in the firms’ economic and financial 
indicators were compatible with strong heterogeneity both at the sectoral level and 
in other dimensions. The article includes a box which analyses recent developments 
in the firms’ liquidity ratios, concluding that some of the firms that had increased 
their liquidity buffers as a precautionary measure in 2020 appear to have lowered 
this ratio in 2021 Q1, in step with the gradual dissipation of uncertainty over future 
macroeconomic developments.
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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN STRUCTURAL AND 
INVESTMENT FUNDS
Victor Forte-Campos and Juan Rojas
Published on 23 June 2021
In December 2020 the European Council approved the regulation establishing the 
European Union (EU) Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027 and the Next 
Generation EU recovery facility. Both mechanisms will help provide in the coming 
years for financing worth €1.8 trillion to sustain the EU’s post-pandemic recovery 
and its long-term priorities. To set the scale of these funds and the challenge of 
managing them in context, this article firstly describes the European Structural and 
Investment Funds. It then offers a detailed analysis of the amount and composition 
of the resources received to date under these funds, along with their distribution by 
type of expenditure in the biggest EU countries, with particular emphasis on Spain. 
Lastly, given the regional focus of the allocation criteria, the final section of the article 
dissects the course, composition and distribution by type of expenditure of these 
funds among Spain’s different regions.
FINANCIAL FLOWS AND BALANCE SHEETS OF HOUSEHOLDS AND NON‑
FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS IN 2020
Víctor García-Vaquero and Juan Carlos Casado
Published on 17 June 2021
The Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy show that in 2020 the developments 
in balance sheets and financial transactions were strongly influenced by the health, 
social and economic crisis and by the extraordinary economic (monetary, fiscal and 
financial) policy measures adopted to mitigate its effects. Against this background, 
unlike the previous three years, households reduced their debt in the form of bank 
loans, essentially owing to the sharp slowdown in consumer credit. However, given 
the more pronounced contraction in household income, their aggregate debt/gross 
disposable income (GDI) ratio rose by 2.1 percentage points (pp) to 94.8%, breaking 
the downward trend of the previous years. The debt-to-GDP ratio of non-financial 
corporations also increased (by 12.3 pp to 85%), which is explained not only by the 
decline in GDP but also by the considerable growth in new financing, primarily in the 
form of bank loans. A further relevant aspect in 2020 was the substantial rise in 
holdings of liquid assets by firms and households since firms built up precautionary 
liquidity buffers and households sharply increased their saving.
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G20 DEBT‑RELIEF INITIATIVES FOR LOW‑INCOME COUNTRIES DURING THE 
PANDEMIC
José Ramón Martínez Resano and Sonsoles Gallego
Published on 16 June 2021
The serious economic impact deriving from the COVID-19 pandemic on already 
ailing low-income countries has prompted the search for support instruments among 
the international financial community. The official debt moratorium agreed by the 
G20 for these countries in the spring of 2020 has brought a modest temporary relief 
to their public finances. However, the agreements reached among official creditors 
could facilitate consensus on farther-reaching initiatives for the resolution of debt 
problems in the international sphere. In this connection, the fact that an agreement 
has been reached by the G20 on a “common framework for debt treatments” is an 
important precedent for coordination among official creditors. This article puts the 
debt-relief measures agreed and the challenges associated with their application 
into context. Their implementation and effectiveness will depend on the degree of 
coordination achieved in practice by creditor countries.
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ACRONYMS	AND	ABBREVIATIONS
COUNTRIES AND CURRENCIES
In accordance with the protocol order, the EU Member States are listed 
using the alphabetical order of the country names in the national languages.
BE Belgium EUR (euro)
BG Bulgaria BGN (Bulgarian lev)
CZ Czech Republic CZK (Czech koruna)
DK Denmark DKK (Danish krone)
DE Germany EUR (euro)
EE Estonia EUR (euro)
IE Ireland EUR (euro)
GR Greece EUR (euro)
ES Spain EUR (euro)
FR France EUR (euro)
IT Italy EUR (euro)
HR Croatia HRK (Croatian kuna)
CY Cyprus EUR (euro)
LV Latvia EUR (euro)
LT Lithuania EUR (euro)
LU Luxembourg EUR (euro)
HU Hungary HUF (Hungarian forint)
MT Malta EUR (euro)
NL Netherlands EUR (euro)
AT Austria EUR (euro)
PL Poland PLN (Polish zloty)
PT Portugal EUR (euro)
RO Romania RON (New Romanian leu)
SI Slovenia EUR (euro)
SK Slovakia EUR (euro)
FI Finland EUR (euro)
SE Sweden SEK (Swedish krona)
UK United Kingdom GBP (Pound sterling)
JP Japan JPY (Japanese yen)
US United States USD (US dollar)
AIReF Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility
AMCESFI Spanish macroprudential authority
APP Asset Purchase Programme
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BE Banco de España
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BLS Bank Lending Survey
BOP Balance of Payments
CBA CBSO Annual Survey
CBI Integrated CBSO Annual Survey 
CBQ CBSO Quarterly Survey
CBSO Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCR Central Credit Register
CDSs Credit default swaps
CNE Spanish National Accounts
CNMV National Securities Market Commission
COVID-19 Coronavirus disease 2019 
CPI Consumer Price Index
CSPP Corporate sector purchase programme
DGF Deposit Guarantee Fund
EBA European Banking Authority
EC European Commission 
ECB European Central Bank
ECOFIN Council of the European Communities (Economic and 
Financial Affairs)
EDP Excessive Deficit Procedure
EFB European Fiscal Board
EFF Spanish Survey of Household Finances
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EONIA Euro overnight index average
EPA Official Spanish Labour Force Survey
ESA 2010 European System of National and Regional Accounts
ESCB European System of Central Banks
ESFS European System of Financial Supervisors
ESM European Stability Mechanism
ESRB European Systemic Risk Board
EU European Union
EURIBOR Euro interbank offered rate
EUROSTAT Statistical Office of the European Communities
FASE Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy
FDI Foreign direct investment
FOMC Federal Open Market Committee
FSB Financial Stability Board
FSF Financial Stability Forum
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation
GNP Gross national product
GOP Gross operating profit
GVA Gross value added
HICP Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
ICO Official Credit Institute 
IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
IIP International Investment Position
IMF International Monetary Fund
INE National Statistics Institute
LTROs Longer-term refinancing operations
MFIs Monetary financial institutions
MREL Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities
MROs Main refinancing operations
MTBDE Banco de España quarterly macroeconomic model
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NCBs National central banks
NFCs Non-financial corporations
NPISHs Non-profit institutions serving households
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONP Ordinary net profit
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PEPP Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme
PER Price/earnings ratio
PMI Purchasing Managers’ Index
PPP Purchasing power parity
QNA Quarterly National Accounts
SDRs Special Drawing Rights
SEPA Single Euro Payments Area
SGP Stability and Growth Pact
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SRM Single Resolution Mechanism
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism
TFP Total factor productivity
TLTROs Targeted longer-tem refinancing operations
ULCs Unit labour costs
VAT Value Added Tax
WTO World Trade Organization
CONVENTIONS USED
M1 Notes and coins held by the public + sight deposits.
M2 M1 + deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months + 
deposits with an agreed maturity of up to two years.
M3 M2 + repos + shares in money market funds and money 
market instruments + debt securities issued with an agreed 
maturity of up to two years.
Q1, Q4 Calendar quarters.






— Nil, non-existence of the event considered or insignificance 
of changes when expressed as rates of growth.
0.0 Less than half the final digit shown in the series.
